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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION

Currently, a major policy question and an on-going
debate exists concerning the use of industrial revenue
bonds.

IRBs are financial incentives issued by the govern-

ment to attract firms to specific locations.

The interest

on the bond is exempt from federal income taxes, so interest rates on the loans are several points below conventional rates.

The federal government has threatened to

eliminate IRBs completely, despite the existence of a
large coalition of supporters.

A crucial policy decision

such as this deserves careful scrutiny.

The usefulness of

bonds cannot be examined exclusively in terms of an overall
general framework.

Each of the methods that have been

applied to the bonds' functioning must be given careful
consideration, in order to determine if any useful
variations e x ist.

One such possibility is the Massachusetts

Commercial Area Revitalization District Program (CARD)
which utilizes IRBs in a specific way:

To target growth

into distressed areas of cities and towns.
The purpose of this paper is to determine if a justifiable use for revenue bonds e x ists.
to be answered is this:

The specific question

"Does the CARD Program justify the

use of revenue bonds by achieving its goal of revitalization?"

This question can be broken down into three sub-

parts:
(1)

Is the CARD Program achieving its stated goals?

(2)

Are revenue bonds a major tool in the success of
the program?
(2)

(J)

Do the program's stated goals improve upon the
functioning of revenue bonds?

If it can be proven that these three questions can be
answered in the affirmative, then a justified use for IRBs
e x ists, and the federal government must reassess its proposal for their complete elimination.
A detailed background of IRBs is presented to highlight
the heated controversy that presently exists.

Next, a

chronology of the emergence of the CARD Program indicates
the origins of the program's goals.

This section provides

the background on which to determine whether or not the
specific application of IRBs to achieve CARD's goals eradicates the many problems that have previously been cited
in using the bonds.
The third chapter explains the program's rules and
regulations, and how the program is actually administered.
The fourth chapter presents empirical evidence,
collected through a survey of cities and towns with
approved CARD plans.

This section examines whether or not

the CARD program is achieving its stated goals, and assesses
the actual and perceived success of the program.
Finally, the conclusion concretely states how CARD's
use of revenue bonds is or is not eliminating the drawbacks
of IRBs.

Recommendations are suggested for the future use

of bonds, in addition to steps that must be taken before the
federal government makes this serious decision concerning
the elimination of the tax-exempt status of IRBs.

(J)

CHAPTER II:
INDUSTRIAL REVENUE BONDS

Early History
In the first 100 years of our country's history, public
works projects were financed either privately or through
the issuance of the full faith and credit obligation of
the State.

By 1850 the unsatisfactory financial record

of state-backed public improvements, railroads, canals,
and toll roads caused concern and controversy; thus
many states passed laws prohibiting the pledge of state
or local credit for such projects.
As a result, cities devised the concept of revenue
bonds, which is based on the theory that potential
customers of the service should incur the costs accrued
to provide that service.

Therefore revenue bonds could

be used in lieu of increased municipal taxation.
The first municipal revenue bonds issued in the
United States were offered in Spokane, Washington in the
early 1890's.

They were certificates payable exclusively

from the revenues of the city's waterworks.

At that

time, there was no legislation governing the issuance of
revenue bonds, and the city established through the
courts that revenue certificates could be issued because
they did not constitute a direct and general obligation of
the city.

It became apparent that legislation was needed

to govern revenue bond financing, so in 1897 the State of
Washington authorized the issuance of special revenue
bonds.

Subsequently municipalities effected large-scale

(5)

revenue bond financing of waterworks, power and light
systems, and street railways.
This example set the precedent for other states to
follow, and by the 1920's they were used throughout the
country to finance various public works projects.

Since

the interest on municipal bonds is exempt from federal
income taxes (upheld in the case of McCulloch vs. Maryland),
local governments are able to borrow funds in the capital
markets at interest rates lower than those available to
private borrowers.
During the 19JO's the federal government encouraged
states to create public housing authorities and allow the
issuance of revenue bonds in order to ease the demand for
housing.

Federal government agencies purchased the bonds,

acted as underwriters, and resold them to private investors.
During WWII the use of revenue bonds eased up, since very
few public works projects were undertaken.

After the war

however, large flotations of revenue bonds began again,
due to pent up demand for services.
Most states have statutes to control the issuance of
revenue bonds.

They stipulate that the bonds do not

enjoy the full faith and credit and taxing power of the
government;

they are not general obligations of the

issuing governmental units; and the interest and principal
will only be paid from revenues earned by the project.
The first industrial aid bond was issued in the State
of Mississippi in 1936 .

Au t h ority for the iss u e came from

(6)

the State's "Balance Agriculture with Industry" (BAWI)
plan which was legislatively approved, and made industrial
aid financing available to all Mississippi communities.
This effort came in the midst of the Great Depression,
when southern states were feeling the affects of the
Industrial Revolution through their depressed agricultural
economy.

They witnessed the surging growth of their

northern rivals, and devised this medium to equalize
competition and eventually lead to their economic diversification and rejuvenation.

This state program enabled

municipalities to sell tax exempt bonds to purchase sites
and construct industrial facilities.

The facilities could

then be leased to private firms for a period of time
sufficient for rental payments to cover principal and
interest on the bonds.

Should the tenant default, he

would be subject to eviction.

These industrial development

bonds are of the general obligation type, which pledge the
credit and taxing power of the issuer (the government).
Therefore their interest rate is lower than revenue bonds
and they are more attractive to the private firm, hence
more easily marketed.
The rationale for this use is that bonds will act as
catalysts to attract industry that will in turn absorb
labor surpluses and rejuvenate dying communities.

As new

industry grows, payrolls increase which bring greater
retail sales and services, property values rise, and the
area progresses toward full development.
( 7)

Little attention was paid to industrial development
financing until 1951 when Greenville, Mississippi sold

2i%

Industrial General Obligation (Development) Bonds for

a well known carpet manufacturer.

The Investment Bankers

Association took its stand on November 29, 1951.

It

read as follows:
Whereas, the legislatures in some states have
recently enacted laws authorizing municipalities
to construct or acquire manufacturing or industrial plants for the express purpose of leasing
such plants to private corporations or individuals and to finance such construction or acquisition by the issuance of revenue or general
obligation bonds of such municipalities payable
solely or primarily from the rentals of such
plants; and
Whereas, similar practices in the past have
had injurious effects upon public credit; and
Whereas, if this practice is unchecked it
may react to the detriment of our present
system of free economy and further may ultimately endanger the valuable position ~f state
sovereignty as part of our constitutional dual
system of government; now therefore
Be it resolved, that the IBA of America in
convention assembled recommends to its members
and to dealers generally:
First, that each take it upon himself to
become thoroughly informed on this whole
development and exercise extreme caution in
underwriting or marketing such bonds; and
Second, that each use his best efforts to
inform voters, state legislators, prospective
issuing units of local governments, and other
interested parties of the past experience and
inherent d1ngers of public financing of this
character.
Thus the beginning of the controversy over industrial
development bond financin g .

( 8)

Judicial Decisions
Questions concerning the constitutionality of issuing
bonds for these purposes can be traced through the history
of court opinion on the subject.

In 1875, the U.S. Supreme

Court heard the case of Citizens Savings and Loan Association vs. Topeka, which questioned the use of municipal
bonds to aid industry.

The city issued bonds to attract

an iron works to Topeka.

The company defaulted, and the

bank claimed that the city was liable.

The court held

that in order for the bonds to be paid, funds would have
to come through taxation.

But taxes could only be levied

for a public purpose which this wasn't, so the bonds were
declared void.

The court defined "public purpose" very

narrowly, which has been the major issue in this type of
case.

A dissenting opinion stated that a federal court

could not adjudge a state statute void unless it conflicted
with some provision of the Constitution of the United
States or of the State.

2

This statement wasn't complied

with until the end of the nineteenth century, when the
court adopted a broader interpretation of the function of
state g overnment.

In the case of Jones vs. Portland

(245 U .S. 217, 62 L.Ed. 252 (1917)), the opinion of the
Court said in part that:
While the ultimate authority to determine
the validity of legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment is rested in this Court,
local conditions are of such varying character
that what is or is not a public use in a
particular state is manifestly a matter respecting wh ich local authority, legislative
( 9)

and judicial, has peculiar facilities for
securing accurate information. In that view
the judgement of the highest court of the
State upon what should be deemed a public
use in a particular state is entitled to the
highest respect (62 L.Ed. 878 (1920) p. 255).
In Green vs. Farzier (253 U.S. 233, 64 L. Ed. 878
(1920)), state legislation was questioned that authorized
capital for businesses to come from bond issues which
pledged the full faith and credit of the state (general
obligation bonds; industrial development bonds).

The

Court reiterated its stand that public monies could only be
used for public purposes, but left this determination to
the state.

The case of Carmichael vs. Southern Coal and

Coke Company (301 U.S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245 (1937)),
involved a landmark decision on the question of tax monies
spent for the welfare of individuals rather than the
community at large.

This was adjudged to be in the public

interest:
Expenditure of public funds under the present statute for relief of unemployment, will
afford some protection to a substantial group
of employees, and we cannot say that this is
not for a public purpose .
. . . When public evils ensue from individual
misfortunes or needs, the legislature may
strike at the evil of its source (81 L. Ed.
p. 1256) .
In 1938 the constitutionality of Mississippi's BAWI Act
was questioned in the case of Albritton vs. City of Winoma.
The act was upheld by the State Supreme Court.

The appeal

was taken to the U.S. Supreme Court and dismissed without
an opinion, on the g rounds that there was no federal
(10)

question.

This was the last time a case involving indus-

trial development financing was brought in the U.S.
Supreme Court (181 Mississippi 1975, 178 So. 799, 115 A. LR.
1436 Appeal dismissed per/curriam,

JOJ

U.S. 627, 82

L.

Ed.

1088 ( 1938)).
IDBs have caused little difficulty in federal courts
for they easily satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Not so at the state level, since the borrowing

and taxing powers of the state must conform to the public
service doctrine, and public funds may not be used to aid
a private party.

These obstacles were overcome in

Mississippi in 1938 in the case just cited, when the state
court stressed that a constitution could not be a static
document; it had to change as times and conditions
dictated.

The court reasoned that:

(1)
... It is the duty of government to
provide for the needs of the poor and to
relieve unemployment.
(2)
... No one can deny that the g overnment has authority to do this by the direct
use of tax funds to furnish food and shelter
in kind or money to buy these necessities.
( J)
... The state can also accomplish this
same purpose indirectly by providing employment.

(4)
... Can the state and municipality not
engage the assistance of private industry to
operate the municipally-owned plant, i.e.,
can it not use private industry as a means to
a public end? 3
Kentucky's revenue bond act was upheld by the State
Court of Appeals (313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W. 2d. 8 0 (1 9 50)),

( 11)

but a discussion of public purpose was avoided by recognizing

that revenue bonds do not constitute a use of municipal

money or taxing power.

The use of a city's name and the

performance of services as a trustee was not a loan of
credit.
Favorable state court decisions have followed the
precendents set in these two cases, but there have been
decisions opposing industrial development programs.

A

Florida court held that a proposed revenue bond issue was
unconstitutional on the grounds that the state constitution
prohibited the lending of public credit for private use
(State vs. Town of North Miami,

59

So. 2d. 779 (1952)).

The Court did not address the fact that revenue bonds do
not involve a municipal liability or tay since they are
not a full faith obligation.

A Nebraska decision, which

was overridden in 1960 by a constitutional amendment,
stated that allowing revenue bonds for industrial development involved "fundamental fallacies of reasoning" which
would hinder the private enterprise system and eliminate
the constitution's protection of private enterprise (State
ex. rel. Beck vs. City of York, 194 Neb. 223, 82 N.W. 2d
269, ( 1957)).
State court arguments have been very similar across
the country, although the question of cause and effect is
still debated.

Decisions have continuously resulted from

those points the particular court chose to emphasize;
either public funds aiding private enterprise or private
( 12)

enterprise benefitting the community.
Controversy and Policy Changes
Of all government-sponsored plans to aid industry, IDB
financing has become the most popular type of state and
local industrial financing.

Prior to 1963, most bonds

were issued for small companies to whom conventional
sources were not readily available.

The volume of IRBs

was low and mostly used by southern states.

Today, however,

many companies are supposedly in a cost-price squeeze that
necessitates every possible cost reduction.
The general exemption of all state and local interest
represents a political compromise of a constitutional
issue, and has been under continual attack since its
inception in 1913.

The federal treasury has consistently

opposed it on the grounds of tax equity and revenue loss.
Widespread debate flares periodically, caused in large
part by the allowance of intergovernmental immunity to be
enjoyed directly by nongovernmental parties i.e., bondholders as ultimate recipients of tax exempt interest.
Although Treasury h as historically opposed the tax
exemption for interest on all state and local securities
and does not liberally interpret the intergovernmental
exemption, a contradictory policy was adopted by the
Internal Revenue Service in their first publically promulgated policy statement (Rev. Ruling 54-106; 1954 CB 28).
This tax policy specifically e x empted industrial revenue
bonds from tax es, by defining "obligations of a political
(13)

subdivision" to include bonds issued by a municipality with
the only backing being the revenues generated from leasing
the property.

This public ruling set forth a very liberal

policy in view of prior Treasury policy and of concurrent
Congressional efforts in 1954 to remove the interest
exemption from all state and local obligations.

4

The next public ruling in the expansion of policy
definition came in 1957 (Rev Ruling 57-187, 1957-1 CB 24),
when it was held that interest on bonds issued by an
independent development board on behalf of a municipality
would be exempt.

Thus the intergovernmental immunities

exemption was extended to nonprofit groups, which facilitated local governmental financing by alternative methods.
The final liberal interpretation in 1963 (Rev Rule
63-20) was made by extending the previous policy to
include specific criteria by which to determine when the
issuance of bonds would be on behalf of a municipality:
The municipality must have a beneficial
interest in the corporation while its bonds
are outstanding; and the bonds issued by the
corporation must be approved by the state or
municipality, even though the corporation's
creation and objectives were previously
authorized.5
It is apparent that this ruling is aimed at those who
abuse the law, and not designed to affect those who
operate within it.
Revenue Rule 63-20 was the vehicle for expansion of
the tax exempt industrial financing activity.

Through this

medium the means was available for every state to issue
( 14)

them.

Competition between states for industry was no

longer impeded by differences in constitutional and
statutory authority.

With the classification issue

resolved, substantial growth followed from 1963 to 1968
in the number of states participating, the size and volume
of issues, and the number of large national companies
utilizing tax-exempt IDB financing.

6

On hindsight the liberal policy of IRS toward interest
exemption was classed by former Treasury policymakers as
an administrative error.7

Therefore, in 1968 Treasury

proposed a reversal of policy and a revocation of the taxexempt interest.

Congress exercised ultimate authority to

set tax policy and reached a compromise between opposing
views.

The culmination was a severe restriction of the

scope of allowable tax-free IDB financing (Section 103,

'

IRC of 1954 as amended by Section 107 of PL 96-364 and
Section 401(a) of PL 90-634).
The initial legislation amending IRC Section 103
removed all IDBs from exemption, e x cept for:

(1) certain

"small issues''; (2) specified e x empt activities, and (3)
industrial parks.

Those specifically exempt included

activities such as residential housing for family units,
sports facilities, convention facilities, industrial
transportation (including docks, wharves, grain handling
and storage, port facilities, and airport facilities),
sewage and air or water pollution control facilities,
facilities for supplying local gas or electricity, and
(15)

manufacturer's distribution centers.

These must satisfy a

"public use" to be eligible, which at a minimum includes
being open or available to the general public.

This

definition is up to the discretion of the "exempt issuer"
(government) and is governed by local statutes.
"Small issues" refers to the tax exempt limit on
size and volume, which seeks to assist small businesses
without other means of financing, and to prevent subsidation
of large companies who don't need it.

The Revenue Expendi-

ture and Control Act of 1968 set the original limits on the
size of the issuance at a $1 million ceiling.

Legislation

was amended to a $5 million cap, which includes the
capital e xpenditures made three years before and after
the bond is issued.
e y cluded.

Thus, large high cost projects are

A 1978 amendment increased the issue and

e x penditure limit to $10 million, and granted a special
exception for expenditure rules when used in conjunction
with Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs).

(Capital

e xpenditure limit increased to $20 million, with bond
amount still limited to $10 million.)
The 1968 legislation expressly brought the tax ation
and e x emption of interest on IDB financin g within the
purview of tax policy as conventionally developed in the
l egislative and administrative pr o cesses.
Prior to 1968 IDB financin g was treated as a municipal
sec u rities offering and exempted from re g ulation under the
securitie s laws.

Th e substantial volume of IDB financing
( 16)

by large national industrial firms caused the Securities
Exchange Com.mission (SEC) to question the basis on which
the issues were exempted from securities regulation.

So

in 1968 the SEC issued an administrative ruling requiring
certain industrial revenue bond issues over $JOO,OOO to
be fully registered with the Commission and to conform to
the rules and regulations applicable to any corporate
security.

General obligation oonds, however, were not

subject to the new procedure.

This represents an indirect

approach to regulation 0£ the IRB, rather than attacking
municipal exemption.
Specifically excluded . from the new controls are bond
issues covering public projects or facilities owned and
operated by or on behalf of a governmental unit.

These

include the typical revenue bond financing of college
facilities, hospitals, port authorities, toll bridges, etc.
In general, it appears that the exemption from the definition of a security interest is roughly parallel with the
tax exemption of IDB issues for certain specified activi-

8
.
t ies.
A full SEC registration requires additional costs as
well as an extended time period, which tends to make them
prohibitive to small firms in particular, and less attractive in general.

Large denomination IDBs are no longer as

appealing to tax conscious investors or buyers of municipal
bonds.

Nor have small firms seen fit to rely on IDBs as

they did before, because the new costs tend to offset the

(17)

savings from a lower interest rate.
In combination, the Congressional and SEC restrictions
have severely curtailed the use of IDBs.

No longer is the

interest rate differential between corporate bonds and
large-denomination IDBs a significant cost reducing factor.9
The IDB subsidy as initially constructed failed the test
of consistency with similar investment subsidies because
of the absence of control over or limitation on its availability and use.

Lack of control is traceable to the origin

of the subsidy as an unintended benefit automatically
arising from intergovernmental immunity rather than as a
directly initiated tax policy.

The 1968 legislative and

administrative restrictions established a consistent
investment subsidy policy in the tax law.
Pros/Cons
The explosion of IRBs represents a continuing shift
of tax exempt securities away from their traditional use
in financing local government improvements such as roads,
sewers and schools.

(See Table 1)

This spectacular

growth and alternative usage has made the bonds immensely
controversial.
debate are:

The paramount questions underlying the

What constitutes a "public purpose"?

bonds achieving this end?

Are

Do total "benefits" outweigh

the costs borne by the general public?
IDB financing has drawn severe criticism on several
counts and from diverse sources.

The American Bankers

Association, along with the Investment Bankers Association,
( 18)

TABLE 1
TAX-EXEMPT BONDS1 CHANGING USES
(billions of dollars)

......

'°

Education
Transportation
Water and sewerage (government)
Pollution control (industry)
Hospitals
Single-family housing
Oth er housing*
Industrial aid
Utilities (power,gas,transit)
Oth er**
Total

1960
$2.3
1.3
1. 0
--

1970

1975
$4.7
2.2
2.3
2.2
2.0

5.6

0.6
1.2
2.7
13.4

1977
$5 .1
2.9
3.3
2.6
3.3
1.0
2.7
2.3
4.8
18.7

$17.5

$31.3

$46.7

$5.0
3.2
2.4
--

NA
NA

NA
NA

0.4
-0.3
1. 7

0.1
0.1
1.1

$7.1

NA

*Includes single-family housing before 1977.
**Includes heavy refunding--more than $10 billion--in 1977 and 1978.
SOURCES: Municipal Finance Officers Association, CBO.
Samuelson Robert. "IRB s - Economic Boon or Public Ripoff?"
18 October 1980, p. 1749.

1978

5.8
19 .5

1979
$5.1
2.4
3.1
2.1
3.4
7.2
2.6
7.0
5.4
10.3

$51.6

$48.7

$5.0
3.5
3.2
2.7
2.3
3.2
2.9
3.5

National Journal,

has taken an official stand against IDBs.

Both maintain

that IDBs are a misuse of a governmental right for a
private purpose; and therefore pose a threat to the tax
exempt status of all state and municipal bonds.

Critics

fear that if such issues continue to grow, the U.S.
Supreme Court may choose to question what constitutes a
"public purpose" and impose severe restrictions upon state
and local governments.

The . two associations also feel

that the sale of IDBs drains the pool of investment money
available for local public projects, thus fractionally
increasing interest rates on "legitimate" municipal bond
issues.
A major objection to IDB financing is that companies
built through this method have an unfair advantage over
those that are not.

The counter argument states that this

does not hold for established businesses within the
community, unless the incoming plant will compete with it.
It is recognized that if an unfair increase in competition
does result, the financing should not be undertaken.
Economists say that the luring of industries by IDBs:
(1) leads to inferior resource allocation because firms
will be induced to locate in communities where they would
not otherwise go;

(2) attracts unstable firms that will

continually relocate to find the best deal;

(J)

interferes

with the migration of labor from areas of low productivity
to areas of hi gh productivity and better social and cultural opportunities; and (4)
(20)

constitutes an inappropriate

solution to the unemployment problem compared to the gains
which can be achieved through upgrading education levels,
job training programs, etc.
It is

ar~ued

10

that when a municipal industrial aid

program is at work, a taYable private entity is not

payin~

its fair share, and its costs must be absorbed elsewhere.
But others

ar ~ue

that this contention ignores the newly

created taYable values and spinoffs from the subsidized
company.
The AFL-CIO opposes IDBs on the grounds that they
induce companies to move from unionized areas into low-wage
"right-to-work" states.

The company does not expand, but

rather substitutes one facility for another.

When this

happens the economy is not served; no new jobs are created.
The U.S. Treasury's opposition to the federal tax exemption for IDBs is the concern over the loss of tax
revenues via this loophole, which e x ceeds the subsidy to
the borrower.

They feel that if amounts to a "federal

subsidy to private corporations", and the benefits to
industry are achieved only at the eypense of a loss of
11
federal tax revenues."
According to bonds consultant
John Thompson, " ... As long as IRB issuance was largely
confined to small issues for small or modest-sized companies in states with economic resources well below
averag e, it could be tolerated in our market because the
volume was inconsequential in relation to total tax -exempt
.
issues
... "12
(21)

One of the most vocal critics is Ralph Nader whose
organization published a report in September of
attacking all forms of tax-exempt financing.

1979

His report

asserted that IRBs will cost the U.S. Treasury some $10
million over the next 10 years in lost revenues.

1

3

Although these viewpoints generate strong arguments
for reducing the use of IRBs, some contain false impressions that are not often addressed.
Evidence does not support the AFL-CIO's contention
that IDBs are responsible for firms moving out of unionized
areas to escape collective bargaining.

Most facilities

that use IDBs are branch production facilities representing
net additions to plant capacity - not the relocation of an
existing facility.

They often do locate in non-union

areas, but this is due to available labor, raw materials,
etc.
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The community's ability to build public facilities is

more often enhanced by their issuing of IRBs rather than
impaired.

The new jobs generated broaden the tax base and

strengthen the community's ability to pay off obligations.
Credit ratings are rarely impaired because revenue bonds
are most often used, which are subject to a rigorous
credit examination.
It is argued that the IRB system benefits those small
depressed areas of our country seeking employment and
income for their citizens.

According to M. Pratt, "this

argument may have had some justification JO years ago.
(22)

The

majority of recent IDBs have benefitted the big powerful
companies and larger affluent communities."

1

5 This protest

is heard most often from the eastern and midwestern communities seeking new industry.

Prior to 1965 when most

firms using IDBs were small and considered unattractive,
complaints were mild.

But when name firms began to con-

struct multi-million dollar plants in southern states, the
resistence to IDBs became loud, clear and organized.

Sud-

denly, the negative aspects of IDBs surfaced.
The literature is full of bonds being critisized and
their weaknesses highlighted in an attempt to curb their
use.

Proponents do not often publicize counterattacks

since bonds are firmly in place and have always had strong
support.

The meritorious aspects that have in the past

been ignored or improperly perceived must be balanced
against the arguments just posed, in order to give equal
weight to both sides.
When new industry locates in a community,
created which were not previously available.

jobs are
Not only is

manpower needed to construct the plant, but citizens must
be trained and employed to operate the facility.
A new plant inevitably means increased commercial
activity in the area.

Jobs bring new incomes; new incomes

cause demand to increase, especially in home construction.
Complementary facilities are needed for the primary firm
and its employees.

In an undeveloped area, it may provide

stimulus for new industry, shopping centers, recreational
(2J)

facilities, etc.
Some areas and communities in the United States will
always be relatively underdeveloped and deficient in
essential public services.

They suffer unemployment in

spite of extra efforts to upgrade education and skills.
When this happens, localities can use IDBs to recruit
industry and jobs.

They can be an effective and relatively

inexpensive weapon for local economic growth and development.
When firms are recruited with IDBs, the need for more
state and federal assistance to combat low incomes at the
local level is greatly diminished.

While federal tax

revenues are lost through exemption "loopholes", government
expenditures will also be smaller because unemployment
problems will be less acute.
Therefore from this perspective it is reasonable to
conclud~

that the social and economic benefits of greater

production, more jobs, higher per capita income, more
taxable income, and balanced economic growth may offset,
to a large degree, the real disadvantages of IDBs cited
above.
A second aspect of IDBs which has gone unnoticed is
that they satisfy the preferences of people who would
rather remain in a given community provided they can find
employment.

Jobs created with IDBs help diminish involun-

tary out-migration.

Areas with high rates of unemployment

and depressed retailing and service enterprises are often
eag er for new industry.

In a liberal s ociety t h ese prefer-

(24)

ences of individuals and local communities, unless clearly
against the vital interests of society as a whole, must be
respected; moreover, public policy should be responsive
. d es1res.
.
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t o th e1r
It may not be unreasonable to consider the "legitimate"
disadvantages of IDBs as simply part of the price that
society must pay for achieving balanced regional economic
growth.

IDBs are quite consistent with the precepts of

freedom of choice, local self-help, providing for a
minimum standard of living for all members of society,
and overall economic development.
IRBs' Effect on Location Decisions and Employment Levels
The debate over the proper use of revenue bonds undoubtedly will continue, given its complicated and contraversial nature.

One possible way of abating the strength

of either side is to present facts that will prove whether
or not IRBs are achieving what they are intended to do.
Are they affecting location decisions of industry, which in
turn is e xpected to increase net employment?

The following

section will focus on past surveys and studies that attempt
to answer this question.

But first, an overview of

general location theory is presented that indicates how a
firm, theoretically, chooses its location.
Most industrial location theories treat patterns of
contemporary manufacturing in a nineteenth century framework - transport costs are strongly emphasized and a
static vi e wpoint is adopted.

(25)

These traditional approaches

seek to find the optimal location for an industry or firm.
Two themes are dominent in the literature:

the least cost

approach, associated with Weber, and the market area
approach, associated with

L~sch.

The former assumes entre-

preneurs choose a site where costs, such as transportation,
labor and agglomoration/deglomoration costs, are minimized.
It is totally concerned with costs; demand is assumed to
be constant.

The latter sees the optimum location where

the largest possible market is monopolized; where sales
and revenue potential are maximized.

It is totally con-

cerned with demand, leaving costs constant.

Both can be

critisized for their unrealistic assumptions and closed
static viewpoints.
There are numerous elements that influence the choice
of a site.

Some are:

source of raw materials, transporta-

tion costs, energy, labor supply, unionization, capital,
and entrepreneurial attitudes.

The ideal manufacturing

area would provide four essential requirements:

raw

materials, a source of energy, labor and a market. 17

But

since ideal requirements rarely exist, an individual choice
must be made as to which are most important.

Theoretical

discussions assume that entrepreneurs strive to max imize
their profits by making thoroughly rational locational
decisions.

This assumption is debated by the contention

that the non-economic or personal moti v es exert considerable influence on decision-making .
De s pite the difficulties in attaining a satisfactory

(26)

explanation of industrial locative forces, some common
forces must be at work since there seems to be a theme to
industrial patterns.

A start can be made by comparing

real world patterns with the abstract landscapes of the
location theorists, or by examining case examples of individual industries and the decision-making behind their
site choice.

With the decrease in importance of traditional

economic factors like transport costs, the real world
industrial landscape becomes exceedingly complex to interpret.
To assess the effectiveness of the program, it is
important to know just how effective industrial revenue
bonds are in influencing firms' location and expansion
decisions.

Unfortunately research in this area has been

contradictory.

Some surveys have shown that bonds are a

critical factor in decisions about location and investment
for many firms.
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Other surveys and evaluations of the

effects of bonds on firms' costs have found that bonds
never entered firms' choices among states or among particular sites.

When the bonds influenced decisions, these were

intraregional choices, among similar sites, sometimes
1
across state lines. 9 The bonds almost never affected
expansion decisions at an old site; the level of expansion
20
would have been close to the same without the bonds.
A survey of 5,000 companies in seven southern states
was conducted in the early 1960 1 s to determine those
factors considered important by management in locating

(27)

new or expanding industrial facilities.

Information derived

from the 1,180 responses to the questionnaire in this study
indicates that:
(1)

traditional factors of markets, labor and raw
materials are as important today as ever in
influencing industrial location;

(2)

temporary taY relief has little or no influence
upon the final decision if management is loo~ing
for a permanent location;

(J)

industry will locate in those areas wherein
management foresees opportunities for substantial
profit.
(See Table 2).

Influences of a secondary nature were found to be of
considerable consequence in the final selection of a location.

These include non-economic factors such as the poli-

tical environment, community facilities, and a genuine
spirit of cooperation and enthusiasm in assisting new firms
to become a vital part of the community.

Normally, these

secondary forces are not consciously considered until after
a general geographic area has been selected.

21

Conclusions from an empirical analysis done by Hellman,
et.al., in 1975 show:

(1)

that a revenue bond program is

the most effective kind of program to increase net investment in the area; (2)

among industries, there appears to

be a trade-off between growth potential and ability to solve
immediate unemployment problems; (J)

in Massachusetts

those areas that need help the most participate very little
in efforts to attract industry.

22

Thus, it is necessary

for policymakers to define the purpose of industrial incentive programs and to design and implement the program

(28)

TABLE 2
FACTORS LISTED IN FIRST PLACE AS INFLUENCING
CHOICE OF LOCATION
Total
Mention
Rank

First
Place
Rank

2

1

3

2

1

3
4
5
6
7

5
8
12
[\)

'°

9
4

8

6

9

14

10

10

11

7

12

11

13
13
15
16

16
15
13
SOURCE:

Reasons for Plant Location
Convenience to markets
Availability of bldgs. or other property
Availability of labor
Availability of raw material
Home of management
Center of particular industry
Climate
Lower labor costs
Less unionization
Decentralization of operation
Transportation costs
•
Local cooperativeness
Adequate power
Financial aid
Favorable tax structure
Transportation facilities

Bergin, Thomas and Eagan, William.
Municipal Finance, May, 1964.

Number of Times
Ranked First
142

96
93
89
81

69
48

38
31

25
22
20

18
18

16
11

"Economic Growth & Community Facilities."

according to that purpose.
Reasons for the inconsistency in findings of the
various studies may have to do with the areas of the country studied, the periods in which the studies were conducted,

and the details of the bond programs.

But according

to Margaret Dewar, the difference in results are most
likely due to differences in methodology. 2 3

Surveys of

firms by mail questionnaire, the most common technique,
tend to contain questions that suggest answers, thus
biasing conclusions.

She conducted her research through

personal interviews with open-ended questions that should
correct many of these problems.
One potential problem with her study is the small
sample used:

fourteen firms in eastern Massachusetts.

The interviews explored the decision that a move or expansion was necessary, the choice of a region for location,
the selection of a location within a region, and the
decision to use revenue bond financing.
Results showed that IRBs had nothing to do with the
decision to move or expand.

The question about places

considered for new plant locations showed that firms were
not deciding to make interregional moves.

When managers

talked about the intraregional choice of a new site they
mentioned many of the criteria generally believed to be
significant in location decisions, such as transportation
and labor availability.

A liberal interpretation of the

effects of the bond program is that five out of fourteen

(JO)

firms' decisions were affected.

The bonds did not cause

firms to locate in areas of high unemployment.
These examples are not meant to be a representative
sample of the many studies that have been done in this area.
It points out that caution must be taken in using IRBs if
it is found that other location characteristics dominate
firms' decisions.

Their true positive impact must be

assessed and the use of IRBs must be channeled or targeted
to maximize that impact.
Suggestions for Improvement
Many suggestions have been made over the years concerning the best way to deal with industrial revenue bonds.
These have ranged from precautionary measures, to changes
in the scope of the program, to complete elimination.
In 1965 the Municipal Forum of New York issued a
report on industrial aid financing in which it discusses
the pros and cons, and recommends that this device be used
with care.

It does not take a position on the issue, but

suggests that:
(1)

State a g encies should control the issuance of
bonds;

(2)

The subsidized industry should help pay for the
e x panded municipal services that become necessary;

(J)

All local issues should be supported by revenues.
The government should not be overprotective of
the investor.

(4)

Full disclosure of all pertinent facts is in the
public good and should be adhered to.

(5)

Piracy should b e prohibited. Municipal industrial
aid should be made available only for a bona fide
(J1)

plant expansion, not relocation. 2 4
The committee which issued the report finds that industrial aid financing is consistent with the "American way";
its suppression would be an encroachment upon the philosophy
of free enterprise.

Opponents who seek legislation are

inviting federal invasion of the sovereignty of the states.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
studied the question of industrial development bond financing in a report issued in June of 1963.

They did not take

a stand on its continuation or elimination, but sought to
make industrial aid a more acceptable tool for economic
growth .

They favored limiting their use to rural and semi-

rural areas.

The report highlights ways the program has

been abused and sets forth a suggested program for states
to follow.

The program provides:

(1)

All issues would be subject to the approval of a
state supervisory agency;

(2)

Their issuance would be limited solely to counties
and municipalities;

(J)

The states would give priority to issue to those
communities with surplus labor;

(4)

A limitation should be imposed on the total
amount of such bonds which may be outstanding at
any one time in any given state;

(5)

The states would insure the enactment of legislation ruling out the possibility of "piracy" of
industrial plants by one company from another;

(6)

Amend the Internal Revenue Code so that "firms
which buy the bonds cannot deduct as a business
cost the rents payed for the use of the subsidized
plants". This is to check any abuse of the tax
exempt provision.25

(J2)

The Commission concludes that industrial aid should be
confined to "economically justifiable proportions and circumstances" if it is to be effective.
The Investment Bankers Association took its position
opposing industrial aid financing in 1951.

Despite this

resolution, the interest of businesses have caused more
and more investment bankers to enter the field of underwriting industrial aid bonds.

As a result the Municipal

Securities Committee of the IBA recommended in May of 1963
that legislation be passed as the only way left to curb
the use of industrial financing.
Organized labor is unequivocally opposed to municipal
industrial aid financing.

It claims that it fosters plant

pirating from developed to underdeveloped areas.

"Already

thousands of AFL-CIO members have lost their jobs because
of plant piracy while the communities from which their jobs
have disappeared become new candidates for the depressed
area list.

We call upon Congress and the Administration

to end the improper use of the revenue raised from the taxfree state and local bonds ... 1126
Those opposed to industrial aid financing fear its
abuses.

But many feel that abuses can be controlled.

They

call upon opponents to take a broader view of "public
purpose" and realize that industrial aid financing can
perform a needed public service.
While a few groups either vehemently oppose or
strongly favor industrial revenue bond financing, many feel
(JJ)

that the program's goals and approach must be reassessed.
Even though it has been updated over the years, its scope
must be refocused to adapt to current economic realities.
It is felt that the program has become so widespread as to
render itself useless.

This is apparent in the popular

phrase, "The second war between the states", which used to
describe IRB usage.
In order to focus the program and to counter the
criticism that the bonds provide unjustified business subsidies, several states have enacted further restrictions.

1978 the New Jersey Economic Development Authority's

Since

IRB activities have become more closely focused on areas
of high unemployment, low per capita income, and low per
capita ratables.

It has restricted its assistance for

commercial and retail facilities to Urban Aid cities,
cities eligible for Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs),
or cities which qualify on the basis of its own unemployrnent2
income ratables index. 7

The Authority refuses to support

relocation out of large urban cities, and it will no
longer provide funds for the construction of facilities
built on speculation anywhere outside its targeted cities.
Although the program tries to target the bonds to distressed
areas, its provisions to pinpoint eligible areas is rather
loose.
An "area" incorporates a whole city, and could potentially envelope a region.

It doesn't pinpoint certain

decaying sections of cities, such as older central business

( 34)

districts (CBDs).

It basically insures that affluent com-

munities don't abuse the program.
One of the more stringent local guidelines is found
in Erie County, New York.

In February, 1980 the Erie

County Industrial Development Agency (ECIDA) adopted a
five part policy statement on commercial project revenue
bonds:
(1)

Public financing should be used only to induce a
·firm's location or expansion based on a demonstratable need for such project, its assets to the
region and growth potential, and evidence that
the project is integrated with targeted redevelopment areas.

(2)

Bonds should be used only for projects that would
be economically infeasible without the assistance.

(J)

Only projects that provide needed services in the
area will be funded, provided that it does not
cause substantial disruption of existing employment or facilities of a similar nature in the
area.

(4)

The project must provide substantial employment
and capital investment.

(5)

The agency will require that a payment in lieu
of taxes equivalent to 100% of the assessed
valuation tax levy be contracted to both the
county and municipality.28

The restrictions apply to commercial projects and not
industrial projects because of the disparity between the
two in terms of economic benefits, such as the number and
quality of jobs created.
In Erie County, areas are targeted according to census
tract unemployment statistics, and the amount of effort and
funding provided by the city for the area.
of Buffalo is included as a distressed area.

(35)

The entire city
It does not

focus the program to specific commercial districts.

In

addition to geographic targeting, there are eligibility
criteria set up for businesses also.

The firm must employ

a minimum of 100 persons, and contain a minimum of $2.5
million funding from all sources.

Due to these guidelines,

they've turned down at least 200 projects, including some
companies that have been cited in the past as "chronic
abusers" of the program.
ECIDA has qualified five projects in Buffalo, and has
closed on two.

The Gateway-Waterfront project, which

revitalized siyty-siy acres of vacant urban renewal land,
could not have moved forward without some incentives to
developers.

The initial developer put $10 million into

the project, which set a precedent for the area and
coalesced the investments.

•

It accelerated committments

from banks, and induced a spinoff effect.

Eventually,

$90 million worth of additional investments plus a UDAG
2
were attracted to the once vacant area. 9
The IRB process promotes close cooperation between
the public and private sectors, and is attractive to investment bankers because the projects are reviewed for eligibility beforehand by ECIDA.

By actively marketing IRBs with

specific targeting criteria, ECIDA has been able to avoid
many of the abuses of the IRB program in g eneral.
In response to a survey of National Association of
Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) members in
April of 1981, there was overwhelming approval of the

(J6)

strategy to target IRBs according to some distress criteria.

Some of the comments follow:

- IRBs created 8,000 jobs and retained 7,000 jobs
in Philadelphia; more than 215 firms, both commercial
and industrial, were assisted, stimulating unlimited
spin-off development and investment in parts of the
city which have suffered decades of high unemployment
and low investment ... These firms and their employers
pay taxes -- federal, state and local -- which more
than compensate for any initial loss to the Treasury.
- The Fort Wayne Planning Agency's view of the
enabling state legislation is that it is lacking in
criteria by which to evaluate a proposed project.
"Our planning function would be better served if a
standard comprehensive evaluation process were
required by law for each IRB issue".
- The Portsmouth Industrial Development Authority
has and will continue to restrict use of tax-e x empt
financing to designated redevelopment or conservation
areas. Targeting will enable truly distressed cities
to compete more favorably with outlying areas which
have vast amounts of vacant land for new development.
IRBs are a vital tool in attracting potential
developers to areas which in many cases are marginal
at best.JO
Local officials see IRBs as

primin~

an economic pump,

not welfare for business.Ji
Since the beginning of the Reagan Administration in
1981 and the ensuing budget cuts, Congressional scrutiny
and public debate over the future of IRBs has been widespread.

But this is not to say that their functioning has

been ignored in the past.

In 1978 the Carter administration

proposed elimination of the tax exemption for most small
issues while e x panding it for projects built in designated
distressed areas.

Congress accepted only the second half

of the proposal by raising the capital spending limit from
$10 million to $20 million for projects located in areas

(J7)

receiving a UDAG.

As of the end of 1980, the Treasury

hadn't issued regulations detailing eligibility criteria.
Congressional testimony provided in April of 1981 to

•

the House Ways and Means oversight subcommittee both
praised and scorned the use of tax-exempt bonds.

Represen-

tative Charles Rangel (D - NY), chairman of the subcommittee, submitted a bill that contains specific recommendations
for changes in IRB legislation, linking their use for commercial projects to economically distressed areas.

It also

requires that a comprehensive study be conducted by the
Treasury, with analysis of data and recommendations
presented to the committee by July 1, 1983.

This bill is

still pending in committee.
A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report released in
the beginning of 1980 outlined the use and abuse of small
issue IRBs, and their effects as they impact on federal,
state and local tax revenues.

The CBO report noted that

sales of small issue IRBs have grown rapidly from $1.J
billion in 1975 to $8.4 billion in 1980; and that revenue
losses to the federal government in FY '81 are estimated to
be slightly greater than $1 billion.

CBO's revenue loss

estimates are based on several economic assumptions that
have been contested by other economists.

The revenue gains

from eliminating IRBs would be less than the budgetary cost
because feedback effects (lower tax collections from
reduced economic activity) would offset part of the revenue
gain.3

2

Many feel that as a job generating and revenue

(JS)

raising tool for the local governments, the value of IRBs
is underestimated.
The eventual fate of the tax exemptions is still unknown.

Policy options offered from Congress, the Adminis-

tration, CBO and the President's Commission on Housing
range from maintaining current law to complete elimination
of IRBs.

In between are such options as:

(a)

targeting the bonds' use to distressed areas;

(b)

limiting the commercial use of the bonds;

(c)

elimination of the exemption with a compensating
federal payment to subsidize taxable bond yields;

(d)

requiring public accountability of the use,
either by the pledging of the full faith and
credit of the locality or requiring public
hearings and referendums;

(e)

a local cash match; and

(f)

choosing between the tax exemption or use of the
accelerated depreciation provisions of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act.33

The President 0 s Commission on Housing will establish
a task force to review use of tax-exempt revenue bonds.3 4
The CBO report poses a question for Congress to consider:

"Under what circumstances do federal subsidies that

lower the borrowing costs of private industry serve a
public purpose?"
served:
(2)

(1)

CBO suggests two goals that could be

stimulating investment and employment; and

modifying the market's allocation of credit.35

They

state that if the goal of federal investment subsidies is to
increase investment and employment, a general business tax
cut such as those contained in the Economic Recovery Tax

( 39)

Act might be equally effective.

If the purpose of the

bonds is to stimulate development in economically distressed
areas, then Congress may want to consider ways to target
IRBs toward specific locations or regions and to coordinate
use of the bonds not only with UDAGs, but also with other
federal credit programs.
Despite the much publicized and reported abuses that
have been connected with IRBs, their merits deserve as much
attention so that they can be analyzed and reworked to
solve current problems.

An alternative to eliminating them

in order to curb abuses is to fine tune IRBs to offer a
means of attracting productive investments.

Without re-

strictions to curb abuses or targeting requirements to
make the financing attractive in under-invested areas,
critics of the program have a strong case.

But with

widespread support from both Democrats and Republicans,
their complete elimination is unlikely.

The program's

goals must be rethought and focused, and the value and
potential of IRBs must be realized and altered to conform
to these new goals.

(40)
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CHAPTER III:
ORIGINS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
COMMERCIAL AREA REVITALIZATION DISTRICT PROGRAM

Introduction
In order to fully understand and appreciate the goals
of the Massachusetts Commercial Area Revitalization District
(CARD) Program, an in-depth chronology of significant
events is necessary.

The program did not suddenly material-

ize one day as a stop-gap measure to relieve some iminent
crisis.

Rather, the program and its goals evolved over

many years of deliberation and debate between a variety of
actors.

The emergence of the issues on which the program

is based cannot be precisely determined.
background begins in

Its tangible

1973 with the establishment of the

Wetmore/McKinnon Commission.

Five solid years of consider-

ation ensued which produced a long-term Growth Policy for
Massachusetts.

This included action recommendations from

which implementation tools were devised.

The Massachusetts

CARD program was one such tool, using the amended industrial
revenue bond legislation as part of its incentive package.
The specific details of the CARD program are not presented
in this section, but the goals and intentions stated herein
are directly transferable and applicable to the program.
Likewise, the key actors and sequence of events that follow
are not specific to the CARD program itself, but they are
the indirect forces behing the program's emergence.
Background
Most states in th e U.S. have som e form of le g islation
dealing with land u se issues.

(4 7)

They rang e fro m compre hensive

programs which require state permits for local land use
developments, to state coordination of local land use
decision-making, to specific land use programs; i.e.,
surface mining, flood plain regulations, wetland management,
etc.

State land use legislation has tended to be a response

to a problem of crisis proportions, such as Vermont's boom
in recreation communities, and the severe drought experienced in Florida.
In the early 1970's, Massachusetts lacked any obvious
land use catastrophy that needed an immediate response.
Instead, it was experiencing a steady overall economic
decline in relation to the rest of the United States.
Between 1951 and 1971 urban land increased by
population only increased 21%.

85%,

while

The supply of farmland has

declined by JO% from 1945 to 1976.

Between 1970 and 1975

the unemployment rate in Massachusetts increased from 4.6%
to 12.4% while the national average increased from 4.9%
to

8.5%.

Much of this is the result of the switch of the

state's economy from the industrial to service sector.
While national production in manufacturing, mining, and
construction grew 17% between 1960 and 1973 it declined in
Massachusetts by 11%.

Service industries grew

ally and 89% in Massachusetts.

58%

nation-

Much of the increased

growth in the service sector in the state is located in
the eastern suburban communities.

1

Although these trends

may have had land use implications, they did not warrant
special legislation.
(48)

The state has a long history of strong, autonomous
local self-government.

County government and regional

planning have been largely ineffective in Massachusetts,
since the entire land area is included within the
porated cities and townships.

351 incor-

This tradition was strengthen-

1966 in the Massachusetts Home Rule Amendment, which

ed in

implied that the control of growth and land use was
primarily a local concern.

Consequently, past attempts by

the state government to influence land use or growth
patterns have always been viewed with great skepticism and
resentment.
This tradition of home rule must be contrasted with
the state legislature's long history of progressive social
reforms.

Numerous state agencies carry out programs that

indirectly shape land use and growth patterns, (transpor-

•

tation investments, air and water quality management, tax
policy, etc.) although coordination among them is lacking.
There is apparent contradiction between local response to
state interference in land use decision-making and the enactment of various statutes which give the state overriding
power.

One explanation is that since all these bills

provide for substantial local involvement in their administration, they manage to win support in the legislature.
Massachusetts Growth Policy And Development Act
Prior· to

1975, Massachusetts did not have an articu-

lated urban policy.

In

1973 the Great and General Court

(the legislature) enacted a bill establishing a ''Special

(49)

Commission Relative to the Effects of Present Growth Patterns on the Quality of Life in Massachusetts."
98 of the Resolves of 1973.)

(Chapter

The Commission was the result

of a resolution filed by Representative Robert Wetmore, in
response to the conflict in the late 1960's between economic
development and environmental protection.

State Senators

Saltonstall and McKinnon and Representatives Ames and
Wetmore, the prime movers behind this effort, were also
concerned because of the lack of a coordinated planning
effort in the executive branch.

The Commission was given

a Broad mandate to study a variety of issues, including:
demographic and population trends, the preservation of
agricultural land and open space, the supply and utilization
of the state's land and natural resources, and methods of
community, regional and state planning.
adjourned in November of 1973.

2

The legislature

For almost a year, the

Commission remained inactive.
At the time of the election of Governor Michael Dukakis
in November, 1974 the Growth Commission had just begun to
identify its goals.

The General Court received a great

many bills dealing with a variety of issues, including
land use, growth policy, environmental protection, economic
development, and the reorganization of planning responsibilities.

In order for this Special Commission (called the

Wetmore/ McKinnon Commission) to deal with the scope of
these problems it divided its work by creating four investigative subcommittees.

The Commission was unfunded and

(50)

relied on voluntary staff support to analyze proposed legislation and prepare reports and recommendations.
The subcommittees varied in their ability to attract
outside staff support to generate citizen interest.
Demographi~

Public Education and

The

Information Subcommittees

dissolved, and the Growth Policy Subcommittee never
produced a final report.

Only the Land Use Subcommittee

was a success, due in large part to the diversity of its
staff.

Its chairman, Senator William Saltonstall, was able

to attract over fifty representatives of business, industry,
labor, environmental organizations, state, regional •. and
local officials and the academic community to discuss land
use in Massachusetts.

Staff committments were obtained

from the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), led by
Professor Lawrence Susskind, as well as the State Department
of Community Affairs.
Initial meetings were attended by over one-hundred
people, which eventually divided into six major interest
groups.

After six months of bi-weekly meetings, perceptions

began to change and compromise was reached.
coalitions formed:
bill" factions.

Two distinct

the "process-oriented" and the "strong

The members of the first group were pre-

dominantly state legislators, local officials, representatives of homebuilding and manufacturing interests, and
moderate environmentalists.

Included in this group was

Professor Lawrence Susskind of MIT.
( 51)

They agreed on the

following principles:
(1)

Land use decision-making should remain a local
prerogative.

(2)

Local planning is not sufficiently linked to
decision-making, and the planning process is not
open to public scrutiny.

(J)

The state affects land use patterns through
activities which have no central policy guidance.

(4)

Land use policy must achieve economic development
objectives, not just preserving environmental
resources.

( 5)

Land use planning is not just a rural or suburban
concern.3

To address these problems, the coalition recommended
that localities submit annual planning statements to be
used as the basis for state land use policies.

This

approach emphasized the process of local participation as
well as the policies that might emerge.
The "strong bill" coalition, which included representatives of certain state agencies, strong environmentalists,
and representatives from regional planning agencies, did
not agree with this "bottom-up" approach.

State agencies

were competing for designation as the state's lead land
use agency.

They felt that growth management problems

were well understood, and that local growth policy statements and citizen involvement would take away from things
that would really have an impact, such as administrative
action by a lead land use agency.

The environmentalists

felt that the coalition would not address the state's
critical environmental needs.

(52)

The "process-oriented"

approach was viewed as a diluted compromise among divergent
groups, and therefore would have no impact .

The regional

planning agencies had continuously been pressing for reform
of middle-level (county) government in Massachusetts.

They

maintained that a state-wide participatory process would
fail, based on the lack of interest in existing participatory opportunities at the regional level.
Thus, by late February

4

1975, each faction began to

draft its own legislative proposals, since there were two
distinct concepts of the type of land use bill that
Massachusetts should adopt.
At this time Governor Dukakis created a new Office of
State Planning (OSP), which was given responsibility for
land use, growth policy, and comprehensive planning for
the state.

This meant that existing state agencies would

no longer be in competition for designation as the state's
leading land use agency.

In addition, the Governor in-

formed the Wetmore/McKinnon Commission that he did not see
the need for new land use or growth policy legislation.
Dukakis intended to take an administrative approach to the
resolution of these issues.

This meant that the possibility

of passing a strong regionally-oriented land use bill or
new environmental legislation was extremely low.

As a

result of the Governor's stated position, the cohesiveness
of the "strong bill" coalition rapidly dissipated.
The March

27, 1975 Land Use Subcommittee meeting

began routinely, but discussion quickly jumped to the
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problems of a process-oriented legislative approach.

Debate

and eventual compromise over some of the issues resulted in
the first draft of legislation by the process-oriented
coalition.

The "strong bill" coalition also prepared its

own outline of compromise legislation, which contained only
minimal concessions.

A meeting of the special drafting

committee was held on April 16 to prepare final legislation
to be presented to the entire Subcommittee on April 24.
The "process-oriented" coalition offered its final argument:
... Economic decline is clearly the most highly
perceived issue in the state ... We must attempt to
design legislation that will work towards balancing
the needs for economic development and the needs for
environmental protection. That is, we must encourage
economic growth in areas in which it is appropriate
and where people want it ... Only a process that
involves a large number of people from all levels
of government will be able to formulate such policies
and carry out their implementation ... Local groups,
for the first time, will be given a formal mechanism
for assessing their changing needs and priorities
and informing state and local government of alternative policy solutions which may better address their
needs.5
The Subcommittee leadership and other legislators
present decided that the draft of the "process-oriented"
bill should be submitted to the entire Subcommittee for its
consideration.
Prior to the full Subcommittee's review, Governor
Dukakis appointed Mr. Frank Keefe as director of the Office
of State Planning.

This marked the permanent dissipation

of the "strong bill" coalition, since several of its
members had been actively pursuing control of the newly
created OSP.

More importantly, Keefe committed himself to

( 54)

working with the Subcommittee, and to review their draft
legislation.
An explanation of Keefe's background and position of
power indicates his strong influence on the final legislation.

The Governor designated Keefe as an ex-officio

member of his cabinet, reporting directly to him.

Keefe

quickly became a major player in the Dukakis administration,
through his intimate advisory role to the Governor.
~

When

the cabinet, bureaucracy, local officials, and private
sector leaders became aware of this, Keefe's influence grew
tremendously, which he used to the maximum advantage.
His objectives as director of OSP was influenced by
his previous position as director of planning in Lowell,
Massachusetts, where he organized a revitalization strategy
for the old textile city.

He believed that the combination

'
of physical rehabilitation and strong government leadership
and action would revitalize the decaying commercial downtown
area.

He proceeded to build much of this approach into

Statewide policy.
The principal vehicle in the administration through
which Keefe and OSP exercised a significant role was the
Development Cabinet.

This group was formed during

informal meetings between Keefe and those cabinet members
directly involved in growth and urban-related issues:

the

Secretaries of Transportation, Economic Affairs, Environmental Affairs, Communities and Development, and Consumer
Affairs.

Dukakis formally designated this group the
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''Development Cabinet" in the Fall of 1975,

Its role was to

deal with a wide range of issues, but their evaluation
tended to be in terms of the revitalization of city and
town centers.

The development cabinet attempted to get

relevant agencies and programs to be consistent with the
city centers policy.

The principal emphasis was the

implementation of an economic development policy, channeled
to older town and city centers.
The promotion of this orientation cannot be attributed
to Frank Keefe alone.

Governor Dukakis came to office with

economic development as his central theme, along with
urban revitalization and halting urban sprawl.

These two

objectives, distinguished as a growth/development policy
and an urban policy respectively, were interrelated.

Eco-

nomic growth was to be targeted and channeled toward urban
revitalization.

The uniqueness of Dukakis' policies is

this linkage between economic growth and the use of the
state's powers and leadership to direct it to particular
locations.

This was clearly evidenced in the state's

public investment strategy, and in its committment to
locate state activities in city or town centers.
In addition, Dukakis directed OSP to develop a state
master plan to guide the allocation of state funds and to
identify appropriate areas for development and preserva-

6
.
t ion.
It is interesting to note that the role played by
Professor Lawrence Susskind was considered crucial in the
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evolution of the legislation.?

He and his group from MIT

not only worked with the leadership of the Growth Commission
but also played a key role in pursuading Frank Keefe and
the Governor to support the process.

His influence on the

content of Dukakis policies, though, seems to have been
marginal.
This outline of the key actors and their orientations
provides a crucial background on which to view the unfolding
of the final legislation.
On April 24,

1975 Keefe e x pressed concern to the Land

Use Subcommittee about coordinating state policies which
affect growth, streamlining regulatory procedures which
impede economic development, and focusing on strategies
for revitalization of urban centers.

8

He reiterated the

Governor's position against new legislation, using an
administrative solution instead.

The Subcommittee analyzed

this "bottom-up" policy, and recommended several minor
changes in the draft legislation.
Ne x t, the leaders of the Wetmore/McKinnon Commission
reviewed the revised draft, and were e x tremely interested
in the legislation.

They asked Frank Keefe to review it,

since its goals were aligned with the duties of OSP.
The staff of the Subcommittee continued to revise the
draft le g islation in response to comments received.

Also,

they met with Keefe and his staff regularly in an attempt
to convince OSP of the validity of the "bottom-up" approach.
Keefe maintained the Governor' s position, that integration

(5 7)

and coordination of state and local policies and planning
could be handled administratively.

This view in the

Dukakis administration reflected several factors:

first,

a new governor's natural impatience at having to wait on
a policy which would take months or possibly years; second,
a preoccupation on the part of Dukakis and Keefe with
urban issues and less concern with general land use and
environmental issues; third, a conviction that, because
Massachusetts already had very strong land use and environmental laws on the books which was passed in the late
sixties and early seventies, administrative action and
not new legislation, was needed.9

The Land Use Subcommittee

staff took the position that a joint legislative-administrative approach to the formulation of land use and growth
management policies would be more effective than separate
efforts by either group.

They suggested a new argument

relating to the organizational objectives of the OSP.

If

OSP was to succeed in its policy coordination efforts,
it would need a constituency to support its decisions.
Since many state policies seemed to have negative or contradictory impacts on localities, the most appropriate
constituency would be localities.

Through the "bottom-up"

growth policy formulation process, localities could express
their needs and concerns and provide support for OSP recommendations to change existing policy.
In response to these arguments Keefe began to change
his position.

He came to . see a potential payoff in
( 58)

developing a constituency for the Governor's program in the
towns and cities, so he persuaded the Governor to support
the bill.

He convinced Dukakis that a state master plan

would be difficult to produce and was less important than
a comprehensive planning process.

Also, legislation

would increase public understanding of growth and development issues more successfully than administrative efforts
alone.
On July 21, 1975 the Wetmore/McKinnon Commission
approved the final draft of the legislation, which contained
revisions by OSP and the Land Use Subcommittee.

The bill

was entitled, "An Act Providing for the Formulation of a
Massachusetts Growth and Development Policy."

It was sent

to the Joint Committee on Commerce and Labor to emphasize
the intent to balance economic development and environmental
protection.
The Commission members and Land Use Subcommittee staff
met with a variety of citizens and interest groups prior
to the public hearing, and attracted considerable support
for the bill.

On the Senate floor the bill received

routine consideration.

There was little debate since

Senators Saltonstall and McKinnon had cleared the way with
the Senate leadership.
Review by the House of Representatives did not go so
smoothly.

Representatives Wetmore and Demers met with

every member of the leadership to secure support.

At

this time a small group of home rule proponents began to
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actively lobby against the bill.

There was considerable

debate during the three readings, with a number of minor
amendments included.

Wetmore ended the debate by saying:

This legislation is not an attempt to reduce local
autonomy.
It is an effort to enhance planning capabilities of all levels of government. In the past, much
of the land use and growth policy legislation that
the General Court has reviewed was based on the predetermined notion that the state government knows
precisely what Massachusetts' land use and growth
management problems entail. In fact, one of the
primary assumptions in previous legislative approaches
was that local governments are incapable of dealing
with certain types of problems. In contrast, our
Commission decided to ask the people of Massachusetts
what they think the most important growth and development issues are. We've asked the citizens to help
governmental officials to balance our needs for both
economic development and environmental protection.
We want future growth and development policies to
reflect the needs and concerns of citizens and
communities throughout the Commonwealth. This
effort to involve local officials and citizens in
the preparation and evaluation of state-wide growth
and development policies is unparalleled by any
state in the nation. Cooperation between the e x ecutive and legislative branches in the development of
this bill has been outstanding.
If the bill passes,
this cooperation is insured of continuing. State
growth and development policies are as much a responsibility of this General Court as of the executive
branch. We now have the opportunity to develop
coordinated growth policies for the state which will
reflect local and regional concerns and have the
backing which they need to be effective. For these
reasons, I strongly urge passage of the bill. It
does not infringe on local home rule. Quite the
contrary, it seeks to insure that the cities and
towns will have substantial impact on their own and
the state's future growth patterns.10
With this statement, debate ended and the bill was
passed.

On December 22, 1975, Governor Dukakis signed the

Massachusetts Growth Policy Development Act into law.
O.S.P. Report:

"City And Town Centers"

The first phase of th e effort by the Wetmore/McKinnon
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Commission to initiate a state comprehensive planning
process was over.

The legislation itself was not viewed

as a solution to the many land use and growth management
problems confronting Massachusetts.

It was an initial step

leading to a new outlook toward planning and implementation
of a policy formulation process involving all levels of
government in the Commonwealth.

The Growth Policy and

Development Act represents an agreement between state and
local government to engage in a learning process that does
not embody a clear cut conception of what the end results
will be.

It is a creative rather than a reactive approach

to both citizen participation and public learning.

11

The Growth Policy Act mandated a "bottom-up'' process
consisting of the following steps:
(1)

Local Growth Policy Committees, broadly representative of municipal boards, departments, and
interests in each community, would specify local
growth management problems and objectives;

(2)

Regional planning agencies (RPA's) would compile
local growth policy statements and prepare composite regional reports highlighting development
and conservation needs in each part of the state;

(J)

The Office of State Planning would study all the
local statements and regional reports and prepare
an overall summary of state growth policy objectives responsive to local and regional preferences; and

(4)

The Legislative Commission on the Effects of
Growth Patt e rns on the Quality of Life in Massachu setts (which drafted the Growth Policy Act)
would r evi ew the OSP report, hold hearings, and
recomm e nd legislative and administrative steps
n e cessary to implement growt h policies responsive
to local and re g ional priorities.12

Wh il e t h e bill es tabli sh ing t h is p roce s s did not
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require any locality to participate, a very large fraction
chose to do so.

The communities realized that the state

was serious about developing a growth policy, so most
responded to protect their own interests.

No penalties

would be imposed if the locality did not set up a committee,
but they would incur an indirect "penalty" by foregoing
their input into the state planning process.
Three-hundred-and-thirty (330) of the three-hundredand-fifty-one (351) cities and towns in Massachusetts
participated in the growth policy development process.
More than six-thousand (6,000) residents served as members
of Local Growth Policy Committees;

thousands more were

involved in various local and regional hearings.

For sixty

percent (60%) of the cities and towns that prepared statements, the process was extremely valuable at the local
level.

1

3 This is observable now that local growth manage-

ment policies are more explicit, many more residents
understand the implications of current growth management
policies, boards and departments are pulling in the same
direction rather than working at cross-purposes, action
agenda have been fashioned, and individuals who never participated in local affairs have been drawn directly into
14
the work of municipal governrnent.
In October, 1977, the Office of State Planning published its summary report entitled, City and Town Centers;
A Program for Growth.
(1)

It is divided into five sections:

An overview of local perspectives on growth

(62)

management;
(2)

A region-by-region review of areawide growth
management concerns and priorities;

(J)

A summary of state perspectives on growth;

(4)

An analysis of the points of agreement and disagreement revealed in the first three chapters;
and

(5)

A final chapter outlining specific policy and

action recommendations.
The summary of local perspectives on growth indicates
that cities and towns are especially concerned about preserving their physical character, their social and cultural
character, and the political or governmental organization
to which they have grown accustomed.

According to Local

Growth Policy Committees, threats to community character
include:

rapid and ill-accommodated growth, environmental

degredation, the loss of agricultural activities, suburbanization of outlying areas and the urbanization of inner
suburbs, loss of open space and historic assets, deterioration of traditional centers, poorly planned commercial
developments, and state and federal intrusion into local
1
affairs. 5
The chapter summarizing the state's view of growth
management priorities is not an attempt to respond to the
issues raised in the local and regional sections.

Instead,

it presents the key ideas which are presently being used
to guide state investment and regional strategies.

These

were e xpressed in two earlier OSP position papers, entitled
Towards a Growth Policy for Massachusetts and An Economic

(6J)

Development Program for Massachusetts, released in October
of

1975 and April of 1976, respectively.

The state's

emphasis is on the location and quality of growth (revitalization

of center cities), the level of growth (with

respect to economic development, energy, capital formation
and transportation) , and the role of government in stimulating and channeling growth.
The fourth chapter highlights the points on which the
three levels of government agree:

increasing economic

development; revitalizing city and town centers; maintaining
environmental quality; property tax relief; preserving farm
land; and sensitizing the state to differences in community
preferences.

16

"choices":

growth/no growth; public policy/market forces;

The points of disagreement are posed as

regionalism/home rule; and revenue needs/tax reform.

' part statement of
The final chapter presents an eight
growth policy objectives, which lead directly to specific
action recommendations.

Some of these recommendations are

restatements of proposals that the Governor and his staff
have been advocating for some time, while others unquestionably grew out of OSP 's effort to respond to .t he comments of
localities and regions.

Excerpts taken from the introduc-

tion of the report help to illustrate these points:
The title, City and Town Centers: A Program for
Growth is intended to convey a primary, though not
the only, theme in this report. Certainly, all
future growth could not and should not be channeled
into existing cities and centers. But after a careful
reading and analysis of all growth policy statements,
it is clear that if Massachusetts is to retain and
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revive community and regional character and if the
negative fiscal, environmental and social impacts of
sprawl are to be avoided, major emphasis must be
placed at all levels of government on the encouragement of new growth and development in our city and
town centers.
On the surface, a dilemma emerges from the growth
policy process. On the one hand, communities know
that the state will and must continue to grow if
sufficient employment and housing are to be available
for the expanding population. And yet, on the other
hand, many communities want to remain the same ...
Villages don't want to be suburbs; suburbs don't
want to be cities; and cities don't want to be
wastelands. And in this general desire we have the
resolution to the apparent dilemma. By revitalizing
the major regional centers and by facilitating the
expansion of jobs and housing in central cities we
can sustain the character of these communities as
employment and population centers. And by encouraging
most of the increase in people and jobs in suburban
and rural towns to locate in or adjacent to their
centers, the identity of these communities will remain
separate and distinct from their neighbors and the
role of their centers in the life of the community
will be enhanced.
Thus, the goal of revitalizing city and town
centers is seen as a direct response to an overwhelming desire to preserve the character of the
Commonwealth's communities and regions. Perhaps more
importantly it is an appropriate response to the
often e x pressed concerns about the loss of farmland,
and the deterioration of the environment, exorbitant
local and state tay es, the needless waste of limited
energ y resources, the anticipated demands for decent
housing by an unprecedented number of new households,
and the nagging problem of chronic unemployment.17
Apparently, the structure of the report and many of its
recommendations are closely linked with OSP and gubernatorial positions.

This suggests an unfortunate degree of

"selective perception" (i.e., previously-held positions
have dominated the process of categorizing and interpreting
new information).

The report is clearly a political

document and therefore is not likely to include recommenda-
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th e Governor ' s viewpoin
.
· t . l8
.
.
t ions
opposing
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that the
major problems addressed in City and Town Centers had been
identified since the 1960's by state and local officials,
leading citizens, and the media.

The growth/urban problems

as perceived in the middle and late 1970's in Massachusetts
were not new or startling.

The significant contribution of

the Dukakis years was the linking of problems in a single
coherent form, leading to a clear perspective on policy
directions.
The major question that still remains to be answered
is whether or not the primary objective of the Growth
Policy Act - the shaping of a state growth policy responsive
to local and regional concerns - could and would be achieved.
In October of 1977 a critique of the report was published,
entitled The Impact of Local Participation on the Formulation
of State Growth Policy in Massachusetts.

The authors'

analysis found that, by and large, the OSP report is responsible to the concerns expressed in local growth policy
statements and regional reports.

They present five ways of

justifying this judgement:
(1)

The choice of issues and topics discussed in the
first two chapters follows those expressed in
local and regional reports. Their priorities
do not appear to have been manipulated by the
state, although OSP did design the questionnaire
and guidelines on which they were to base their
deliberations.

(2)

Statewide policies have not taken regional differences into account in the past. OSP demonstrates
an impressive sensitivity to regional variations
(66)

in this report.

(3)

The action recommendations are aimed at making
state agencies aware of the need for increased
flexibility and responsiveness to each community's
priorities when administering programs.

(4)

The recommendations attempt to expand the capacity
of local and regional boards to handle their own
problems; few additional state regulations have
been proposed.

(5)

OSP has proposed very specific measures (through
action recommendations) to further the growth
policy objectives of the cities and towns in the
Commonwealth.19

To most observers the process seems to have been a
success, since participation was active, local reports were
produced, and the OSP summary report was able to reflect a
surprising consensus.
Did this consensus (that city and town revitalization
was central to the Growth Policy of Massachusetts) occur
because of manipulation by Keefe and OSP?
committees and regional agencies co-opted?

Were the local
William Capron

thinks not, although he recognizes that OSP was able to
influence the outcome in at least three ways:
(1)

By preparing the Duka~is administration's first
statement on urban policy, Toward a Growth Policy
for Massachusetts, released in October of 1975;

(2)

By formulating and distributing the questionnaire
and handbook to local growth policy committees;
and

(J)

By preparing the final r~Bort of the results of
the "bottom-up" process.

The local and regional agencies were serious about
this exercise, despite their strong feelings of home rule
and their skepticism toward state-run projects.
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If there

was any indication that the state was trying to co-opt them,
local leaders would not have participated to the e x tent
they did.

This is partly confirmed by comments received

after the publication of the report in September of 1977.
From November 1977 through January 1978, the state Growth
Policy Commission held seven hearings in various parts of
the state to solicit comments from local officials,
citizens, and members of local growth policy committees.
Over 400 persons participated in these hearings; written
and oral statements were received from about 200 persons.
The Growth Commission's third interim report summarizes
the results of these hearings:
The OSP report was consistently praised for accurately identifying and reporting local sentiments on
important growth and development issues.21
Thus, the Growth Policy that was to shape Massachusetts' future was a combination of two separate and
distinct elements.

One was an attempt to develop a new

process that would identify the state's most pressing
issues and problems through a "bottom-up'' approach.

The

major actors behind this effort were Senator Saltonstall,
Repre s entative Wetmore, and Professor Susskind.

The other

was the promotion of the established goals of the administration at that time.
ponents of this effort.

Duk akis and Keefe were the key proEach of the el ements work e d in

combination with the other, producing a final product that
was satisfactory to most, if not all, of the many inter es ted
parti e s.

(68)

Implementation
In actuality, the legislation and subsequent report
were only the preliminary steps in achieving the intended
results.

The Growth Policy Development Act and City and

Town Centers provided the framework on which to base implementation strategies.

Seventeen bills have been enacted by the

legislature, in direct response to specific recomme ndations
included in OSP's report.

22

In addition, a number of

administrative actions have been taken through executive
orders, and the Growth Policy has guided state resource
allocation decisions.
Several of the bills specifically focus on the revitalization

of city and town centers.

Three bills provide

tax-exempt financing, mortgage guarantees, and property
tax credit to commercial investors in blighted downtown
areas.

A local aid program was developed that includes a

revised aid formula to help older urban communities.

Speci-

fie legislation in 1978 was enacted to stimulate economic
development and urban revitalization in Massachus e tts.
These were dev e loped primarily through the organization
of regional conferences beginning in 1976.

Ex t ensive

meetings between the localities and the state through
regional centers were h e lpful in three important ways.
First, state officials developed an appreciation for the
realities of local problems.

Second, the shortcomings of

state pro g rams in addressing local problems and strategies
we re identified and corrected.
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Third, and most importantly,

a cohesive working relationship between state and local
officials was formed that was the catalyst in developing
and approving legislation.

This coalition of urban economic

interests advanced the development priorities of local
officials as well as created a force independent of the
state to support growth policy legislation.
Mayors, community development officials, developers,
representatives of organized labor, and businessmen were
enlisted in the legislative process at critical times.
These groups were a key element in the passage of five
economic development strategies:
(1)

Legislation established the Massachusetts Capital
Resource Company, to provide funding to new
businesses in the state;

(2)

Legislation established the Technology Development
Corporation, to provide technical assistance and
start-up capital to small, innovative technologybased businesses;

(J)

Legislation established the Massachusetts Industrial Finance Agency, to add several important
improvements to the industrial revenue bond
process;

(4)

Legislation established the Community Economic
Development Assistance Corporation, to provide
technical assistance to neighborhood redevelopment
organizations in their efforts to bring about
commercial revitalization and job creation;

(5)

Amendment to the industrial revenue bond legislation of 1968, to include commercial and mixed use
projects targeted to distressed communities.23

The long-term success of these programs depends on the
capacity of state and local governments to organize and administer them.

The new administration in Massachusetts

u nder Governor King has eliminated the OSP and has turned

(70)

over implementation of the urban policy to the Department
of Communities and Development.

The new Secretary, Byron

Matthews, played an active role in the development and
implementation of the Dukakis urban policy, and much of the
bureaucracy embraces the policy's central elements.

Thus,

the foundation and support exists by which to carry through
the programs adopted by the legislature.

'

(71)
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CHAPTER IV:
CARD PROGRAM - RULES AND REGULATIONS

A description of the Commercial Area Revitalization
District Program serves to illustrate one mechanism that
was developed by the Massachusetts Legislature to achieve
the goal of urban revitalization.

The philosophy of the

program parallels the goals of the Growth Policy for Massachusetts, displayed in the report by the Office of State
Planning, City and Town Centers:

A Program for Growth.

It

implies that urban revitalization is the keystone for social
change, by restoring economic vitality and physical soundness to communities.

Local revitalization programs, such

as CARD, have as a major goal to attract commercial, institutional, and office investments to city and town centers,
close to urban populations.

This is expected to reverse

the trend toward sprawl, wasteful land use, and erosion of
community character.

This is based on three strategic

principles:
(1)

New is not always better. Revitalization links
a community's past to its future, and enhances
the attractiveness for private investment through
the identification of its own unique "character."

(2)

The definition of revitalization programs has
expanded to include the use of public investments
to leverage private investment and additional
public committments.

(3)

Effectiveness of revitalization strategies is
limited by the bias of federal and state investment programs toward exurban growth, which has
reinforced the market bias of the last three
decades. The state can help restore some balance
in growth and land use decisions by changing the
flow of public facility investments to city
centers.1.

(??)

The CARD program's goal is to assist communities with
older downtowns to reverse the trend of commercial decay by
stimulating public and private investment.

The public pro-

vides needed capital improvements and the private sector
uses the CARD program's financial incentives to reverse the
cycle of commercial disinvestment.

These economic develop-

ment incentives, previously available only to industrial
enterprises, can now be applied to commercial and mixed-use
projects in targeted areas.

Commercial projects may include

the construction of a new building or the rehabilitation of
an existing building for commercial purposes (i.e., hotels,
office space, restaurants, etc.).

Mixed-use projects

include the rehabilitation of any single building for mixed
commercial and residential use.
The first incentive provides financing at interest
rates several points below conventional rates through taxexempt industrial revenue bonds.

This is negotiated between

the applicant and a private lender and approved by the city
and state agencies involved.

The interest income to the

lender is exempt from federal income taxes, and therefore
the lender can offer terms more favorable than those available on conventional loans.

The applicant (through a bond

counsel) determines if the project meets Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) size limits in order to be eligible for taxexempt financing:
(1)

When the bond issue is over $1 million, total
capitalized expenditures cannot e x ceed $10 million
over a six year period (three years before and

(78)

three years after the bond issuance date);
(2)

When the bond issue is $1 million or less, the
total capital expenditures restriction stated
above does not apply;

(J)

When the issue is for a project that has received
an Urban Development Action Grant, the maximum
capital expenditures limit is raised to $20 million, but only $10 million of the bond issue will
be tax -exempt.

(4)

When the bond issue is for pollution control,
public garages, solid or liquid waste disposal,
or certain other exempt facilities, there is no
limit on the size of the bond issue or capital
expenditures.2

For mi x ed-use projects, there are additional IRS regulations:
(1)

Only renovation of an existing building, not new
construction, is permitted.

(2)

Fifteen to twenty percent of the rental units
must be for low to moderate income households.

(J)

No more than ten percent of the bond proceeds can
go towards the commercial portion of the project,
but each building must contain a commercial component.

A second incentive for enterprises includes mortgage
insurance on rehabilitation of commercial buildings.

This

public assistance is limited to approximately $400,000 per
project, and is administered by the Massachusetts Industrial
Finance Agency.
The third mechanism of the CARD program to attract
private investment is through the Urban Job Incentive
Program.

This program, administered by the Massachusetts

Department of Manpower Development, provides two forms of
tax reduction:

A credit against a corporation's state
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excise tax liability; and a

25%

payroll deduction.

Communities committed to revitalizing their downtowns
can, with an approved CARD plan, offer financial incentives
to developers willing to invest in the CARD area.
In order to be eligible for the program, the municipality must contain a commercial center with the following
criteria:
It must be an older established commercial center;
and
It must be experiencing commercial disinvestment.
This includes a large vacancy rate in commercial
buildings, loss of commercial sales, loss of
significant retail businesses, or physically
deteriorating commercial buildings.
Once a community has pinpointed an area that potentially qualifies, it must produce a CARD plan which contains
the following components:
(1)

Rationale for designating the CARD. A statement
describing existing economic development problems,
clarified with data on market conditions over the
past several years.

(2)

Plan Objectives. A description of how the problems
in Section (1) will be addressed, and how existing
commercial enterprises will be encouraged to remain
in the CARD area.

(J)

CARD Boundaries. A description of the boundaries
through a street and city map, and reasons for
delineating those specified boundaries.

(4)

Land Use and Zoning of the district, through a
description and a map.

(5)

Plan Strategy:
(a)

Public improvements and facilities to be provided.

(b)

Description of each project that could use
the development incentives.
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(c)

General character of redevelopment, including
its emphasis on expanding and attracting
businesses.

(d)

Local financial committment, including issuance of general obligation bonds and use of
CDBG funds.

(e)

Compatibility with downtown development, so
that the plan complements existing revitalization strategies.

(f)

Land use and design controls, including
signage, historic district designation, and
design review.

(g)

Conformance with other local plans, including
master plans, urban renewal plans and other
pre-existing plans.

(h)

Business community participation, involving
the plan formulation, marketing the plan, and
knowledge of available incentives.

(i)

Local implementing agency's powers and experience.

(j)

Evidence of public hearing to inform citizens
of the proposed CARD boundaries.

(k)

Additional documentation, including a resolution by the local governing body, a certificate by a recording officer attesting to the
resolution, and an opinion by the Legislative
Council that the plan is in accordance with
all statutes and regulations.

The draft CARD plan is then submitted to the Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities and Development (EOCD)
for review.

In order for the Secretary to approve the CARD

plan, the following findings must be made:
(1)

That the boundaries describe a predominantly commercial geographic area;

(2)

That the proposed CARD area is suffering from commercial decay;

(3)

That the plan describes specific strategies
designed to reverse the commercial decay, in-
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eluding public actions and the use of development
incentives;
( 4)

That the local governing body of the municipality
has approved the plan;

( 5)

That the business community was involved in planning the CARD;

( 6)

That a strategy has been designed to publicize
and educate the business community concerning
available development incentives;

( 7)

That the CARD plan takes into account any officially adopted local plan covering all or part of
the CARD area;

( 8)

That a local agency has been identified with the
capability to oversee implementation, and will be
responsible and accountable for the marketing of
the plan;

( 9)

That the local governing body has held a public
hearing prior to approving the plan.3

Approval of the CARD plan remains valid for two years.
After that time, EOCD reviews the plan to determine if it
should be renewed for an additional two years.

This is

dependent on:
(1)

The use of the development incentives to date; and

(2)

The e x tent to which the municipality has followed
through on its committments to the CARD, including
both public improvements and the strategy for involving the business community.

The important aspect of this program is that it encourages the targeting of all funding sources - public infrastructure, development incentives, and private capital into those areas that will benefit and need it the most.
This philosophy counteracts the tendency to spread scarce
resources too thinly, thus resulting in no one area achieving
its maximum potential.

The CARD program is a catalyst for
(82)

the rejuvenation of deteriorating city and town. centers
across the state.

It provides a unique approach to the

alleviation of specific growth and development problems
that are e xperienced not just in Massachusetts, but all
over the United States.

(SJ)

FOOTNOTES
1Massachusetts. Office of State Planning. Urban Massachusetts Revitalization Catalog (Boston: Office of State
Planning, May 1978).
2Boston Redevelopment Authority, The Commercial Area
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)Massachusetts. Ex ecutive Office of Communities and
Development, CARD Plans: Rules and Regulations (28 April

1981):

p.J.
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CHAPTER V:
RESULTS OF THE CARD PROGRAM

Intention of Survey
The major goal of the CARD Program is to revitalize
the decaying downtowns of city and town centers.
to achieve this

~oal,

In order

it encourages the targeting of public

and private resources into certain designated areas.

One

method that is used to attract business into these previously undesireable areas is the provision of tax-eYempt
IRBs.

This financial incentive offers lower interest

rates than on conventional loans, and provides needed
capital for the location of businesses.

The attraction of

a few sizeable firms into the district with IRBs, along
with the provision of public infrastructure, are intended
to act as catalysts for the revitalization of deteriorating
centers.
In order to determine whether the CARD

Pro~ram

is

achieving. its stated goals in Massachusetts, a survey was
conducted for collection of primary data.

The information

received is expected to answer the following questions:

Is

the CARD Program achieving its goal of revitalizing city
and town centers?

Are bonds a major tool in attracting

firms to decaying downtowns?

Do these firms act as cata-

lysts in revitalizing business districts?

The answers to

these questions will give a good indication of the current
status of the program.

The survey helps determine, in

general, whether the prog.ram is successful or unsuccessful,
from the viewpoints of the respondents surveyed.
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It also

pinpoints the program's strengths and weaknesses, and

su~

gest improvements for greater effectiveness.
Methodology
The type of survey design employed for the evaluation
of the CARD Program was the mailed questionnaire.

(See

Appendix for a copy of the letter of explanation and the
two-page questionnaire.)

The population consisted of every

district within the state with an approved CARD plan as of
March 1982.
Since some cities contained more than one district, a
separate questionnaire for each district was sent to every
city and town with at least one approved plan.

The letter

of explanation and questionnaire (s) were sent to those
persons who wrote each of the plans.

Names and addresses

were obtained from the CARD files at the State Executive
Office of Communities and Development (EOCD), and were
assumed to be accurate.

It was expected that the authors

of the plans were the most knowledgeable about the back~round

of the program, the problems encountered in carrying

it out, and the prior conditions in the district.

It is

possible that the current situation was unknown if the
author was no longer employed in that town, but it was
assumed that the information could be easily obtained.

The

potential for systematic bias always e x ists, since those
who completed the survey may have been those most informed
or interested in the pro g ram.

It is reali ze d that those

who answered may have had the most information to report,
(88)

i.e., the greatest amount of activity in their districts.
Thus it is possible that a proportionally greater amount of
activity was reported than actually took place across the
State.
Strict confidentiality was assured, so as to obtain
the most truthful answers and comments.

Trends in the data

across the state were to be determined, not case studies of
individual towns.
Open-ended questions and a comment section allowed for
as much flexibility in the answers as possible.

This left

some discretion in the analysis, but most answers tended
to follow a pattern and could be catagorized.

Trends and

causal effects were expected to become apparent in the
analysis of the factual and attitudinal data received.
General Information
The Executive Office of Communities & Development
(EOCD) began approving CARD plans at the end of 1978.
Since that time,
a total of

93 cities have received plan approval, for

153 districts.

Table

3 gives a list of the

cities and towns by population with the number of districts
located within each.

Map #1 presents the spatial distribu-

tion of the cities and towns with CARD plans.

Table

4

gives the number and percentage of districts according to
the population of the city/town in which they are located.
These figures are presented to be compared with the cities/
towns that answered the questionnaire.
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TABLE 3
CITIES AND TOWNS WITH APPROVED CARD PLANS
City/Town

1980
Populationa

# of
Districts

Boston

563,000

20

Springfield

152,000

7
6

*
*

*
*
*
*

*
*
*

Districts

Bourne

14,000

1

Brockton

1

Canton

98,000
18,000

Chelsea

25,400

1

Chicopee

1

Clinton

55,100
12,800

Danvers

24,000

1

Dracut

21, 200

1

Easton

16,600

1

Fitchburg

39,000

1

Quincy

84,500

5
5

Newton

83,600

3

Northampton
Arlington

29,300
48,200

3
2

Beverly

37,600

2

Everett

37,200

2

Fall River

98,000

2

Framingham

65,100

1

Falmouth

23,600

2

Gardner

17,900

1

3,000

2

Georgetown

5,900

1

Lawrence

63,100

2

Gloucester

26,000

1

Lowell

94,000

2

Greenfield

14,200

1

Lynn

78,000

2

Haverhill

46,900

1

Melrose

30,000

2

Holyoke

1

Methuen

36,700

2

Lee

44,700
6,400

1

New Bedford

2

Leominister

34,500

1

Revere

98,500
42 ,400

2

Malden

1

Wareham

18,500

2

Mansfield

53,400
14,000

w.

27,000

2

Marlborough

30,600

1

13,500
10,400

1

Marshfield

4,000

1

1

Medford

58,100

1

1

Middleboro

7,000

1

Amherst

13,700
17,800

1

Andover

8,400

1

Millbury

23,500
12,000

Athol

11,000

1

Montague

8,000

1

Attleboro
Ayer

34,500
6,800

1
1

Natick

31J200

1

Needham

1

2,000

1

27,900
17,000

Springfield

Abington

*
*

# of

Brookline

Gt. Barrington

*

*
*
*
*

1980
Populationa

95,000
55,900

Cambridge

*
*

City/Town

Adams
Amesbury

Barnstable

1
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*
*
*
*
*

*
*

*
*
*
*
*

Milford

Newburyport

1

1

1

1

1

TABLE

*

3 (continued)

City/Town

1980
# of
PopuDislationa tricts

N. Adams

18,000

1

N. Andover

20,100

1

N. Attleboro

21,000

1

6,000
4,000

1

Peabody

48,000

1

Pittsfield

52,000

1

Plymouth

7,232
28,200

1

15,700
38,200

1

Oxford
Palmer

*
*

Randolph
Rockland
Salem

*

*

*
*
*

1

1
1

Scituate
Southbridge

17,300

1

12,900

1

Stoneham

21,400

1

Stoughton

26,700

1

Taunton
Uxbridge

45,000
8,400

1

Wakefield

24,900

1

Walpole

18,500

1

Waltham
Ware

58,200
6,800

1
1

Watertown

34,400

1

Webster
Westfield

14,500

1

36,500

1

Weymouth

55,600

1

Whitman

13,500
22,000

1

35,000
162,000

1

1

'

*
*
*

Winchester

*

Cities/towns that answered the questionnaire, and the population that each reported.

a

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Massachusetts, 1980.
(Population of those cities/ towns that didn't
answer the questionnaire.)

Woburn
Worcester

1

1
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TABLE 4
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DISTRICTS AND THOSE THAT RESPONDED TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
ACCORDING TO THE POPULATION OF THE CITY/TOWN IN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED.

Population

-...

Total # Of
Districts

# Of Districts

(Within That Pop. Cat.
Total # Of Districts

# Of Districts
That Responded

# of Districts That
Responded./ Total #
Of Districts In That
Pop. Catagory

Under · 10,000

15

10%

4

27%

10 - 15,000

12

8%

7

58%

15 - 20,000

11

8%

6

55%

20 - J0,000

21

14%

10

48%

JO - 40,000

15

10%

6

40%

40 - 50,000

8

6%

2

25%

60,000

11

8%

7

64%

60 - 70,000

J

2%

0

0

70 - 80 ,000

6

4%

0

0

*

80 - 90,000

8

6%

5

6J%

*
*

90 - 100,000

12

8%

6

50%

Over 100,000

23

16%

16

70%

145

100%

69

*
*

\.()

\J\

* 50 -

Total

*

Those population catagories in which information was received for at least 50% of the
districts in that catagory.

Analysis of Data
Of the 93 cities/towns that comprised the population
of the study, 42 returned the questionnaire.
response rate.

This is a 45%

Of the possible 153 districts with active

plans, data was received for 71 of them.

This 46.4% re-

sponse rate is the more important of the two for this analysis.

This sample was considered to be a good representation

of the cities and towns that contained districts.

All

percentages calculated and trends charted for the sample
were assumed to be indicative of the program in general.
Column

4 of Table 4 shows the percentage of districts

for which data was received by population size of the corresponding city.

(Question #2).

Those districts for which

data was received tended to be located in the larger cities
(80,000+), but this is due in part to those cities having
the greatest number of districts.

Greater than 50% of the

districts responded from towns with a population from
10,000 - 20,000 each.

Of those that answered the question-

naire, JO% had their plans approved before 1980, 38% were
approved in 1980, and 32% were approved in 1981.

(Question

#7) (See Table 5).
In order to put the data into perspective, it is
important to know who the respondents were; 96% can be
classified as city or town planners or planning officials,
i.e., Planning Board chairmen, Redevelopment of Community
Development officials, economic development specialists,
etc.

The remaining 4% were "others", i.e., Selectmen,

( 9 6)

TABLE 5
YEARS WHEN PLANS WERE APPROVED

Year

Total # of
Approved Districts

,,......

'°

% of

Total

# of Districts

Total # That

Districts

That Responded

Responded

1978

2

1%

1

1%

1979

34

23%

19

29%

1/80 - 6/80

31

21%

10

15%

7/80 - 12/80

37

25%

15

23%

1981

41

28%

21

32%

1982*

3

2%

0

Total

148

100%

66

--,,)

*Plan approval as of March 1982.

0

100%

local Industrial Development Finance Authority officials.
(Question #1).

A reasonable assumption was made that these

people were well-informed about activities in their locality .
The type of commercial centers that were designated as
CARDs were as follows:

56% were primary central business

districts (CBDs), 30% were neighborhood commercial districts, 10% were secondary CBDs, and 4% were considered to
be "strip development" within larger cities.

(Question

#4).

The questionnaire provided a table on which to list
the businesses (by type) that exhibited "activity"; i.e.,
those that have moved into the district, expanded, or moved
out since the plan was approved.

Pertinent data that

describes each business was requested.

Thirty-seven percent

(37%) of the districts reported no activity as of yet.
Thirty-eight percent (38%) of these were recently approved
(in 1981 or 1982), so it may have been too soon to evaluate
the success of these districts.

The other

62% which have

had considerable time to attract businesses listed various
reasons for no activity.
Of the

63% that did report activity, a total of 107

businesses, or

96%, have moved into the district or e x -

panded, and only 4% (five businesses) have moved out of the
district.

These e x isting firms were all small retail shops;

i.e., clothing store, shoe store, camera shop, furniture
store, pizza shop.

These employed only a few people each.

Of those that did locate or expand in the district,

79%

were new businesses that moved in and 21% were already
(98)

located there, but expanded.
Table 6 lists the types of businesses that located
and expanded in the district, and the percentage of each.
Since the questionnaire was open-ended, the respondents
listed the types of businesses according to their own
classification system.

No standard definitions were pro-

vided, so these categories may not be mutually exclusive.
Business/office buildings were represented the most, accounting for 36% of all those who located in the districts.
Other uses, i.e., banks, food and clothing stores, services,
etc., ranged from three to nine percent each.
The incentive used the most by businesses to locate
or expand in the CARDs was the industrial revenue bond.
SiYty-six percent (66%) of all 107 businesses used the
advantage of tax-free interest on their loans.

Table

7

lists the types and percentages of businesses that used
the bonds.

Office buildings accounted for 53% of the bonds

used, while banks accounted for 11%.

Table 7 also gives

the percentage that used bonds within each type of business.

For example, all (100%) of the retail malls,

theaters, mi x ed use, and motels that located in districts
used revenue bonds.

Only 33% of the food stores, clothing

stores, and restaurants used bonds.
Of the 55 bonds that had cost figures attached, a
total of $106,607,000 in bonds wa s reported.

This averaged

out to approximately $2 million p e r project.

Five very

larg e projects received bonds betwe en $7 and $10 million

(99)

TABLE 6
TYPES OF BUSINESSES THAT LOCATED
OR EXPANDED IN THE DISTRICT

Total # of
Businesses

% of Total

Offices

40

36%

Banks

10

9%

Services

9

9%

Misc. Stores

8

7%

Food Stores

7

7%

Clothing Stores

6

6%

Medical

6

6%

Restaurants

6

6%

Misc. (School, Video)

6

6%

Theater/Museum

3

3%

Hotels

3

3%

Retail Malls

2

2%

Mixed Use

1

1%

107

100%

Type of Business

Total

(100)

each.

Six small projects used bonds between $150,000 and

$250,000.
Bonds were backed by other public financing in at least
fourteen cases.

Of the fourteen bonds supplemented, Urban

Development Action Grants (UDAGs) were used for half of
the projects.

Table 8 lists the types of other financing

by amount, and the corresponding IRB figure.
Employment generated in downtowns with the help of the
CARD program was a good indication of the program's success.
It was possible to determine which businesses located in
the district due in part to CARD incentives by
number that used bonds.

coun~ing

the

Employment figures were reported

for 77 businesses, and they generated a total of 5784 jobs.
Ninety-seven percent (97%) of these jobs were provided by
the 59 firms that used bonds.

That calculated out to be

95 jobs per firm, as opposed to 10.6 jobs per firm for
those that didn't use bonds.

Obviously, firms that used

bonds were large employers.
Ownership status was reported for 70 businesses; 47%
were corporations, 24% were individuals, 23% were partnerships, and 6% were non-profit corporations and trusts.
Those firms that used bonds were 55% owned by corporations,
34% by partnerships, 9% by non-profit corporations and
trusts, and only 2% by individuals.

This was contrasted

by non-bond users, which were 62% individuals, 35% corporations, and 3% partnerships.

The conclusion reached is

that corporations tended to take advantage of bonds, and
(101)

TABLE 7
TYPES OF BUSINESSES THAT USED BONDS

Type

# Of

% Of

Businesses
That Used
Bonds

Businesses
That Used
Bonds

Total
# Of
Businesses

# of
Businesses
That Used
Bonds
Total # of
Businesses

37

53%

40

93%

Banks

8

11%

10

80%

Medical

5

7%

6

83%

Services

5

7%

9

56%

Theaters

3

4%

3

100%

Retail Mall

2

4%

2

100%

Food Stores

2

3%

7

29%

Clothing Stores

2

3%

6

33%

Hotels

3

3%

3

100%

Restaurants

2

3%

6

33%

Mixed Use

1

1%

1

100%

70

100%

93

100%

Offices

Total

TABLE 8
TYPES AND AMOUNTS OF OTHER FINANCING
Other Financing
Catagories
UDAG
Private
Urban Renewal Funds

312 Loans
CDBG
Total

# Of
Projects

Amount

Amount
Of Bonds

7
3
1
1
2

$13,994,ooo
8,800,000
181,000
100,000
80,000

$36,434,000
11,500,000
213,000
400,000
470,000

14

$22,155,000

$49,017,000

( 102)

individually-owned firms tended not to.
When asked if the respondent thought that the businesses

would have located in the district without the subsidy,

68% thought that it probably would not have.

(Question #4).

Sixty-seven percent (67%) of all 107 businesses rehabilitated older buildings in the district and
new buildings.

33% constructed

Sixty-four percent (64%) of the businesses

that used bonds rehabilitated buildings.

(Question #5).

Twenty-one percent (21%) of the CARDs were partially
or entirely located in a National Register Historic District.
Eleven firms were reported as having considered another
site for location.

(Question #5).

bonds to locate in the district.

Of these, nine used
Four contemplated another

town, three were interested in the strip development nearby,
two considered other sites in town, and one each considered
the suburban shopping mall and the intersection of two
major highways.
Forty-one percent (41%) of the CARDs reported "strip
development" nearby.

(Question #10).

Seventy-six percent

(76%) of these strips have stayed the same, and 24% have
e x panded.

(Question #11).

Of those strip developments

that expanded, all the CARDs in the vicinity reported a
decrease in their vacancy rate.

(Question #9).

When asked if parking had become strained in the district since approval, 58% said no, 18% - yes, 11% - always
has been, 9% - same, and 4% - yes, but more parking is
being provided.

(Question #16).

(103)

Seventy-three percent

(7J%) of the districts reported

the provision of public infrastructure.
Twenty-three percent
streets,
walks,

(Question

#17).

(2J%) of this was the upgrading of

19% was for parking, 19% for sewers, 11% for side-

9% for water mains, 8% for landscaping, 6% for light-

ing, and

5%

for traffic improvements.

Forty-six percent

(46%) of the funding for this infrastructure was Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) money;
funds;

15% was from local

15% was from UDAGs; 8% was from state funds; 8%

was from Economic Development Administration (EDA) funds;
and

8% was from the Urban Systems program.

(Question

#17).

When asked who initiated the idea to establish a
district, the breakdown was reported as follows:

22% by the planning department, 1J% by

the city/town,
businesses,

46% by

7% by both the city and businesses, 6% by both

the planning department and businesses, and
planning department and the city/town.

6% by both the

(Question

#12).

Of the businesses that requested the plan, half of them
eventually located in the district using a revenue bond.
(Question

#lJ).

The vacancy rate in

82% of the districts had stayed

the same since plan approval.
increase, and

No districts had shown an

18% had decreased their vacancy rates.

drop was significant, at an average of

41% per district.

Before plan approval, the average vacancy rate was
as opposed to

8.J% afterward.

Eighty-three percent

This

(Question

11.7%,

#9).

(8J%) of the respondents felt

(104)

that there had been at least some visible improvement in
the district since the CARD program was initiated.
tion #18).

(Ques-

Seventy-eight percent (78%) said property

values had increased in the district (Question #19), and
86% said that the tax base had increased.

(Question #20).

It was not possible to determine how much the CARD Program
had e x clusively contributed to this revitalization, since
other efforts and market forces may have been working in
combination with CARD.

However, only 22% of the respondents

felt that the district would have been revitalized without
the program.

Twenty-four percent (24%) envisioned revita-

lization eventually, but they felt that it would not have
occurred so soon or as quickly without CARD.

(Question #21).

Question #22 requested a description of the problems
that the respondent had e x perienced with the program.
Thirty-three percent

'
(33%) claimed that they had no problems

whatsoever with the program.

Thirty-si x percent

(36%) of

questionnaires received explicitely stated that the major
problem wit h the program was that the use of the IRB incentive was restricted to large firms.

The cost of the bond

counsel was prohibitively high, and made the issuance of
bonds under $200,000 unprofitable.

EOCD is currently work-

ing on a solution to this problem, which is considered to
be the major flaw in the program.

It consists of a provi-

s ion for "umbrella loans", in which a number of projects
can each get a s eparate loan, but share one bond and one
bond couns el.

This would reduce the processing costs, and
( 105)

make smaller loans feasible.

The bonding process discrimi-

nates against smaller towns who have trouble attracting
the larger enterprises that tend to use the bonds.

There-

fore most towns don't receive the full range of intended
benefits from the program.
ted to the small towns.

But the problem is not restric-

One-half of Boston's twenty dis-

tricts have had no bonding activity.

These are all neigh-

borhood commercial districts that have attracted projects
with development costs under $250,000.

The bond council

would cost $20,000 each, so in the long run it is not a
profitable deal.

One respondent suggested that the revenue

bonds be supplemented with a special provision in the district for Small Business Administration (SBA) loans.
Eight percent found that banks were not interested in
issuing the revenue bonds.

A few other problems were stated

once or twice, such as the bond's interest rate is still too
high for many firms to borrow money at, the packaging of the
bonds was difficult, and obtaining financing was difficult
for firms even if the plan was in place.
Trends in the Program
The analysis of this data and the results of various
cross tabulation:> present important implications concerning
the CARD Program.

The program is generally attracting

businesses from out of the area to locate in the district,
and is encouraging the expansion of existing firms somewhat.
Very few businesses have been forced out, with the aggregate
re sult being a net increase in businesses.

(106)

This is one in-

dication that the districts are being revitalized.

Most of

the businesses that locate in the districts used revenue
bonds.

These firms tend to be large, labor intensive,

corporate-owned offices that have rehabilitated existing
buildings for occupancy.

The bonds were successful in re-

distributing firms from what are often thought of as more
desireable areas to these decaying downtowns.

This indi-

cates that the bond incentive is extremely important for
the proper functioning of the CARD program.

The bonds have

contributed to the revitalization of the city and town
centers by attracting large businesses that provide new
employment for the area.

These firms serve as the critical

anchor that is crucial in any revitalization effort.

They

provide spinoff benefits to the district and make it less
risky for smaller firms to locate nearby.

It overcomes

the "prisoner's dilemma", (see page114) which is a persistent problem in less desireable areas.
In addition to private firms contributing to the
district, almost all of the towns are displaying their
committment to the area through the provision of public
infrastructure, and the targeting of funds.

Most of the

cities/towns initiated the process to produce a plan,
which highlights the "decaying" district as the focus for
the town's revitalization efforts.
The combination of public and private committments to
designated areas is the surest way to achieve the goals of
the CARD Program.

The statistics show that vacancy rates

(107)

have dropped substantially in certain districts, and that
property values and the tax rates have increased in most
districts.

A consensus has emerged that the CARDs show a

definite visible improvement since inception.
Thus, the three questions posed at the beginning of
this chapter can be answered in the affirmative.

The CARD

Program is achieving its goal of revitalizing city and town
centers; bonds are a major tool in attracting firms to
decaying downtowns; and these firms are acting as catalysts
in revitalizing the commercial districts.
Comments received on the questionnaires highlight the
localities' confidence in the program.

(Question #23).

A

number of the respondents stated that CARD was the key to
their revitalization efforts.

It is a successful tool in

rejuvenating their decaying downtowns, and has brought
life back into their dying community.

Many feel that it is

a superior program that can promote an area's full potential
when used in combination with other tools.

The program has

opened communication between the public and private sectors,
and a working relationship has been established through the
CARD Program.

This is a valuable outcome that will per-

petuate and add to the success of future endeavors .
The concept of the CARD Program has been transformed
into reality in Massachus etts.

Concrete re s ult s are quan-

tifiable, and the program can be adequately evalu ated.

With

this information presented, a conclusion can be reached
concerning the value of revenue bonds when u s ed in specific

(108)

situations.

( 109)
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CHAPTER VI:
CONCLUSION

Does The CARD Program Justify The Use Of IRBs?
Chapter II highlights the controversial nature of IRBs,
and outlines some of the major problems that exist in their
continued use.

These assertions are justified when directed

at the IRB legislation in general.

But these negative

reports have failed to consider alternative ways of using
IRBs.

They take the narrow viewpoint that IRBs are generally

not working, and therefore have no justifiable use and should
be completely eliminated.

This paper attempts to move beyond

this stunted analysis by evaluating a targeting program that
incorporates revenue bonds into its functioning.

A reitera-

tion of the fundamental shortcomings of IRBs is posed, and
the CARD Program's response to these is presented.
A major contention is that bonds do not affect firms'

'

location decisions because they are available in almost
every state of the Union.

The original intent of the legis-

lation has been disguised, resulting in a solution that
does not attend to the problem.

The CARD Program however,

requires businesses to locate in a certain designated area
in order to receive the subsidy.

Targeting assures that

the bond will benefit distressed areas.

Moreover, evidence

shows that almost all of the firms who chose the district
over an alternative location used revenue bonds.
Currently, the . federal IRB legislation allows a firm
to locate anywhere and receive the subsidy.

This includes

affluent, high employment communities in which the firm

(112)

would have located anyway.

The CARD Program affects loca-

tion decisions on an intra-regional level, or more precisely, an intra-city level.

This means that businesses will

be redistributed from the prosperous strip development and
suburban shopping malls (where demand for space often tends
to eYceed the supply) into the older downtown commercial
centers (where the supply of space generally exceeds the
demand).

Firms need to see that the city is committed to

the downtown area, by improving on the existing infrastructure and channeling available funding into that area.
The incentive makes the downtown location more attractive
by reducing the risk involved.
The Investment Bankers Association (IBA) contends that
the issuance of revenue bonds is getting out of hand, and
some measure should be taken to restrict their use.

This

is eyactly what the CARD Program doe s ; it realizes that
bonds as incentives are not properly used in many cases,
so it limits them to specific areas where they will be
advantageously utilized.
The long-standing argument over what constitutes a
"public purpose" continues to be debated.

IRBs use public

funds to subsidize businesses, so it is deduced that
federal taxes are aiding private enterprise.

The problem

with this argument is that the ultimate goal of the subsidy
is being overlooked.

It is true that public money is being

transferred to the private se ctor, but this is not meant to
be the end re sult.

These subsi di ze d firms in turn are
( 113)

expected to provide jobs to these unemployment areas, which
will eventually create spinoffs i.e., complementary businesses, that lead to revitalization of the whole area.
Many argue that if a business uses a bond to locate in a
previously prosperous area in which market forces are working favorably, then the bond is not being used for its
intended purpose.

The CARD Program dispels this argument

by designating the neediest areas, and directing bonds to
commercial centers that will benefit the most.

The provi-

sion of jobs and upgrading of a city/town constitutes a
public purpose that is the responsibility of the whole
nation.
Others point out the inequity that results from only
certain firms receiving IRBs.

Businesses in the area that

don't receive the subsidy are discriminated against, and
it upsets market competition.

This is true if the subsi-

dized firm is a direct competitor of an existing firm.

But

the CARD Program is sensitive to this by not approving a
bond when there is a competing firm nearby which is prospering.

In addition, many of the districts are initially

risky areas where few single firms would consider locating
in isolation.

However, if all businesses at the same time

agreed to locate in the district, then no subsidy would be
needed to revitalize the area.

In reality this never

happens , and is known as the "prisoner's dilemma".

This

means that the first few businesses to enter a distressed
area require an advantage to overcome the prisoner's
( 114)

dilemma.

Once this process is begun and spinoffs are

created, the area is no longer distressed and should lose
its CARD designation.
Economists say that redistributing firms by providing
subsidies leads to inferior resource allocation.

Firms

will not be as efficient in the forced location as in the
area that would be chosen according to market mechanisms
because they would not be max imizing their cost/benefit
ratio.

This means that there would be reduced national

productivity and a lower gross national product (GNP).
But businesses are only concerned with their own expenditures when they choose a location.

They don't consider

the money the government must spend so that they can locate
wherever the market steers them.

They take for granted

the provision of infrastructure which the government often
automatically provides according to the whims of business.
The government goes deeper into debt and tax es are raised
each time new infrastructure must be provided.

In addition,

environmental considerations are often neglected by business.

Haphazard growth involves hidden costs that must

be addressed eventually.

Our scarce natural resources

must be protected by government through the promotion of
concentration of growth.

Business profit-maximization

decisions may be wasting valuable resources, because only
one side of the picture is looked at.

Market location

decisions may be efficient for business in the short run,
but may not be in the b e st int e rests of the nation in th e
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long run.

The Massachusetts CARD Program was designed to

capitalize on existing infrastructure in established city
and town centers.

It is inefficient from the national

point of view to abandon useable infrastructure or to spend
more money providing it somewhere else.

In addition,

established cities and towns each posess a unique character
that deserve to be maintained.

The costs of sprawl are too

easily overlooked, and should be checked by controlling and
targeting growth into e Yisting city and town centers, the
chief goal of the Massachusetts Growth Policy.
Thus the CARD Program's goals present a sound approach
to growth policy.

Most of the shortcomings of the present

IRB legislation are eliminated when applied to the CARD
philosophy.

In order to determine whether the use of bonds

in this capacity is justified, the success of the CARD
Program in achieving its goals must be proven.

In addition,

bonds must be an integral part of this success.

Chapter V

confirms the success of the program with the use of IRBs,
by presenting empirical data.

In general, districts show

signs of visible improvement since the inception of the
CARD Program.

This revitalization would not be possible

without the availability of IRBs.

Thus, through success-

fully achieving its goal of revitalization, the CARD Program presents a justifiable and beneficial use for industrial revenu e bonds.
Recommendations
The F e deral government has seriously considered the
complet e e limination of industrial r evenue bonds.

(116)

This is

due to the tremendous loss of money to the federal treasury,
and the extensive publicity covering the e Yploitive use of
bonds by large profitable companies.
The repeal of all industrial revenue bonds means that
the CARD Program will lose its major implementing device.
This is illogical since the program is successful and dispels most of the problems facing bonds.

Proponents ob-

viously have not examined all the facets of IRBs and their
potential.

If they had, they may have realized that it is

not an "all or nothing" decision.

IRB legislation should

be reassessed in terms of the variations that e x ist for
their use.
General IRB legislation for bus ine s s enterprises is
responding to old problems.

Their use began in the 1930s

in response to inequalities caused by the Industrial Revolution.

These problems are no longer occurring in the

same form.

New problems have emerged, and we are still

using an old remedy that was not designed for our current
situation.

This is why the legislation must be rethought

and manipulated to respond to today's world.

The economy

of the Northeast and the role of cities in general are
being transformed from that of production centers into
service centers .

This evolutionary process cannot and

should not be disputed.

Rather, programs should respond

to this changing structure by promoting the s ervice industry
in city and town centers.

This should be undertaken not

just in the booming regions.
(117)

A balance must be reached

for equity across the U.S.

Since the CARD Program uses

bonds for this purpose, it has found a way to employ the
subsidy for current needs.

Targeting bonds to specific

areas and for specific purposes is the key to their successful future.
Additional research into this area is necessary before
any amendments could even be

sug~ested.

IRBs have been

selectively used in various ways in a few regions in addition to Massachusetts, i.e., Erie County, New York; New
Jersey metropolitan areas; Portsmouth, Oregon.

However,

the Massachusetts program appears to be the most sophisticated and structured approach.

The other methods should

be evaluated also, to extract any successful variations
for the improvement of the CARD philosophy.

The foundation

exists for bonds to be fine-tuned to serve a useful purpose
again.

A concerted effort must be undertaken to refine

and polish the functioning of the CARD Program with the
use of IRBs, so that it can act as a model for all the
states in the Union to follow.

(118)
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APPENDIX

Department of Community Planning
36 Upper College Road
University of Rhode Island
Kingston, RI 02881
March 5 , 19 8 2
re:

CARD Plan

Dear Sir/Madam:
I am currently a second-year graduate student in the Department
of Community Planning and Area Development at the University of
Rhode Island. This questionaire is an integral part of my Master's
thesis project, entitled, "An Evaluation of the Massachusett's Commercial Area Revitalization District P.rogram." Each individual or
group throughout Massachusetts who wrote a CARD plan will receive
this questionaire, and I am hoping to obtain as close to a 100% return as possible.
If you are not the aforementioned party, please
forward this to the author of the plan.
You can be assured that your responses will remain completely
confidential. This data in no way will be disaggregated by town;
I am looking for trends in the data for the State as a whole.
I
have been in contact with, although not commissioned by, Mr. Ed Mangini from the Executive Office of Communities and Development. He
will review this report upon completion in May of 1982.
It would be greatly appreciated if you would complete one
questionaire for each district _ in your community, and return it
promptly to the above address.
If you have any questions whatsoever,
please feel free to contact me at home (401-789-1455), or leave a
message at my office (401-792-2248) and I will get back to you
shortly. Thank you very much for your time and effort.
Sincerely,

Jeanmarie Miller
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6.

Is the CARD in a National Register Historic District?

7.

When was the CARD plan approved?

8.

Date plan was renewed:

9.

Vacancy rate in district prior to plan approval:

.0.

Renewal not requested:
Currently:

Is there an established "strip development" within a few miles of the
district that contains the same types of businesses?

.1.

Has this expanded, declined, or stayed the same since approval?

. 2.

Who initiated the idea to establish a CARD district (i.e., town, business,
Chamber of Commerce, etc.)?

.3.

If a single business requested the plan, has it located in the district
using a revenue bond?

.4.

Do you think the business would have located in the district without the
subsidy?

.5.

Are there similar market areas nearby where the business could have
located?

.6.

Has parking in the district become strained since approval?

.7.

What types of infrastructure has the city provided in the district, and
how was it funded?

L8.

Is there a visible improvement in the district since approval?

.9.

Have property values generally increased in the district?

'.O.

Do you feel that the tax base has increased in the town?

'.1.

Do you think the revitalization of this commercial district would have
taken place in the near future without the program?

'.2.

What problems have you experienced with the program?

'.3.

Other comments:

(Attach an additional sheet if necessary)

